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RAISING RIVALS' COSTS: CAN THE AGENCIES DO 
MORE GOOD THAN HARM? 
Alan J. Meese· 
By their nature, contracts constrain the parties to them; that is the 
point, indeed the definition, of contract. 1 Ironically, contractual restraint on 
freedom of action can actually enhance liberty, by facilitating cooperative 
efforts and joint ventures? Without such restraints, cooperation would col-
lapse, exploding the economy into individual atoms and casting society into 
poverty? This Hobbesian state of nature is not a blueprint for economic 
. 4 prospenty. 
Productive cooperation, and the contracts that support it, can take 
many forms. Some cooperation is casual and sporadic, as when a refiner 
buys crude oil on the spot market. Other cooperation is more stable, as 
when a gasoline station agrees to purchase, and a refiner agrees to supply, a 
certain quantity of gasoline over a five-year period, while leaving the sta-
tion free to purchase any additional requirements of fuel from other 
sources. Finally, some cooperation may be even more permanent, even 
"exclusive," as when a refiner obtains a station's agreement to distribute its 
fuel and only its fuel, either by purchasing stations outright or by entering 
into exclusive dealing contracts, thereby denying other refineries the right 
to distribute their product through a particular outlet.5 
• Ball Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. J.D., University of Chicago; A.B. 
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I See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918) (noting that the binding 
effect of contracts "is of their very essence"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS§ 1 (1981) 
(defining a contract as "a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy"); 
id. at § 2 (defining a promise as "a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified 
way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made"). 
2 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION, 14 
( 1981) (stating that enforcement of promises enhances individual liberty by allowing individuals to bind 
themselves to future action); see also F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, 140-41 (1960). 
3 See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-180 (1911) (suggesting that interstate 
commerce would not be possible without enforcement of "normal and usual contracts"); N. Sec. Co. v. 
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 411 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing how a ban on reasonable 
restraints would "disintegrate society so far as it could into individual atoms"). 
4 See Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The war of all 
against all is not a good model for any economy."). 
5 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (evaluating such an agreement 
under Section 3 of the Clayton Act). 
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Because of their "exclusive" impact, these so-called "exclusionary 
rights agreements" may seem the paradigmatic example of anti-competitive 
contracts. "Competition," after all, would appear to require all market ac-
tors to have maximum freedom of action, unencumbered by restraints on 
their liberty to reach particular customers. In the world of perfect competi-
tion, there is simply no place for exclusionary rights agreements.6 
Still, exclusionary rights agreements are ubiquitous, and they often 
arise in contexts where conditions cannot support anti-competitive conduct 
or results. Kobe Bryant, the star forward for the Los Angeles Lakers, can-
not simultaneously play for another NBA team; if he did, the Lakers would 
likely trade him or reduce his salary. The shareholders and employees of 
Ford agree that General Motors may not use Ford's facilities to manufac-
ture automobiles.7 Nonetheless, Ford's competitors manufacture millions of 
automobiles a year. At the same time, Ford dealers do not sell Chevrolets, 
although this exclusivity hardly prevents Chevrolet from reaching consum-
ers. A reporter for the Chicago Tribune who filed her best stories with the 
Chicago Sun Times would soon be looking for a job at a different paper.8 
Finally, a partner at Skadden, Arps cannot moonlight for Cravath, Swaine 
and Moore.9 In short, numerous commercial arrangements require one or 
more parties to devote its labor or property exclusively to the venture, thus 
denying the venture's competitors access to useful inputs. The ubiquity of 
such agreements in apparently competitive markets suggests that the vast 
majority of them are beneficial, or at least do no harm. 10 
6 See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Meaning of Competition, in INDNIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC 
ORDER 92, 96 ( 1948) [hereinafter Hayek, The Meaning of Competition] (explaining that economists' 
model of perfect competition assumes a "state of affairs" that excludes by definition numerous business 
practices necessary to bring about "competitive" results); Paul McNulty, Economic Theory and the 
Meaning of Competition, 84 Q. J. ECON. 639, 641 (1968) (explaining that a perfect competition model 
treats all forms of everyday competition as evidence of monopoly power); Joan Robinson, The Impossi-
bility of Competition, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEIR RESOLUTION 245-46 (E. H. Cham-
berlain, ed. 1954) (explaining that the perfect competition model treats all limits on rivalry of whatever 
form as welfare-reducing). 
7 Cf. Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & ECON. I (1983) (ex-
plaining that a firm is simply a series of agreements between participants). 
8 Cf. Paddock Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting anti-
trust challenge to exclusive arrangement between newspaper and wire service). 
9 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,280 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) (dis-
cussing how the law evolved to "encourage" provisions in articles of partnership that prevented partners 
from participating in other ventures). 
10 See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(Bork, J.) (arguing that absent a showing of market power, courts should presume that challenged ar-
rangements produce economic benefits); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (explaining that an absence of market power suggests that arrangement is procompetitive or 
harmless); see also Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 239-40 (reasoning that an absence of market 
power by proponents of challenged restraint suggested restraint was reasonable). 
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This is not to say that all exclusionary rights agreements make society 
better off. Some may well interfere with rivalry in a manner that creates or 
protects market power to the detriment of consumers. Some may even have 
both effects--creating market power and facilitating useful cooperation. 
In theory, antitrust regulation can separate the wheat from the chaff 
when it comes to exclusionary rights agreements. To do so, however, soci-
ety must develop a methodology capable of discerning harmful contracts 
from those that are beneficial. It is not enough for such a methodology to 
exist. Regulators must also be willing to apply it when passing on the legal-
ity of challenged agreements. Where there is no such methodology, or 
when regulators fail to apply it, antitrust regulation may do more harm than 
good. 11 
For several decades, society had no sound methodology for distin-
guishing beneficial exclusionary rights agreements from those that pro-
duced social harm. Neoclassical price theory, the dominant economic 
framework of the 20th century, presumed that non-standard contracts-
agreements that went beyond spot market contracting-were expressions of 
market power, regardless of market structure. 12 Antitrust regulators-both 
agencies and courts-followed suit, and condemned such arrangements 
whenever possible. In so doing, they enforced an atomistic vision of "com-
petition," overlooking the possibility that such agreements promoted useful 
cooperation thereby furthering useful rivalry in the real world. 13 
Economic theory has advanced significantly over the past few dec-
ades, providing society with useful methods for distinguishing exclusionary 
rights agreements that create wealth from those that destroy it. For one 
thing, transaction cost economics has discovered beneficial rationales for 
exclusionary rights agreements that price theory presumed monopolistic. At 
the same time, the raising rivals' costs paradigm has offered a disciplined 
method for identifYing exclusionary rights contracts that may reduce con-
sumer welfare. Taken together, the transaction cost and raising rivals' costs 
paradigms provide society and antitrust regulators with the tools necessary 
to ban those agreements that destroy social wealth while leaving others 
unscathed. 
II See Ronald H. Coase, The Regulated Industries: Discussion, 54 AMER. EcoN. REv. 194, 195 
(1964) [hereinafter Coase, The Regulated Industries] (explaining how shortcomings in regulatory appa-
ratus can render results of regulation inferior to those produced by imperfect private market). 
12 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, 
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING, 23-25 {1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS] (defin-
ing so-called non-standard agreements and distinguishing such contracts from "classical market con-
tracting"). 
13 See infra notes 96-114 and accompanying text (describing so-called inhospitality era of anti-
trust law). 
244 GEO. MASON L. REv. [VOL. 12:2 
Still, regulators do not always use the tools that economic science 
places at their disposal. 14 Antitrust regulators are no exception. Over the 
last few decades, both courts and the enforcement agencies have stubbornly 
clung to a handful of outmoded per se rules and definitions of monopolistic 
conduct, some of which apply to exclusionary rights agreements. At the 
same time, both branches of government have articulated modes of Rule of 
Reason and merger analysis that are unduly hostile to non-standard agree-
ments, including exclusionary rights contracts, that plausibly combat mar-
ket failure and enhance economic welfare. 
Of course, the executive branch has no direct control over the antitrust 
rules promulgated by the courts. At the same time, however, the agencies 
have complete discretion over their own enforcement positions; no court 
can force an agency to challenge a particular contract or transaction. More-
over, if agencies do challenge a particular contract, they can litigate cases 
and present evidence in a way that influences the content of resulting doc-
trine. Finally, agencies can file amicus curiae briefs that seek to influence 
the outcomes and judicial opinions that result from private litigation. By 
themselves, then, agencies can have a substantial influence on the regula-
tory landscape that firms face. 
This essay contends that the enforcement agencies have adopted en-
forcement policies that are unduly biased against exclusionary rights con-
tracts. While the raising rivals' costs paradigm is a useful tool for evaluat-
ing such contracts, the agencies have in recent years embraced enforcement 
positions that exceed the scope of regulation implied by this model. At the 
same time, the agencies have embraced positions that ignore the teachings 
of transaction cost economics and thus undervalue the prospect that such 
contracts produce significant efficiencies. Absent a substantial reworking of 
agency positions, antitrust regulation of exclusionary rights agreements 
may do more harm than good. 
Part I of this essay examines the role that economic theory should play 
in the administration of the antitrust laws, with particular reference to the 
enforcement agencies. Part II recounts the impact that outmoded economic 
theory previously had on enforcement policy and doctrine governing exclu-
sionary rights agreements and explains recent advances in economic theory, 
notably the raising rivals' costs and transaction cost paradigms, that provide 
useful tools for analyzing exclusionary rights contracts. Part III explains 
that enforcement positions taken by the agencies sometimes ignore the les-
14 Cf Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that an agency's decision not to take 
enforcement action in response to citizen's requests is presumptively unreviewable); Indus. Union 
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum lnst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion) (voiding regulatory 
standard where agency declined to engage in scientific cost-benefit analysis). 
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sons of these paradigms and offers some proposals for remedying these 
deficiencies. 
I. ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
A Economic Theory in the Courts 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids "contract[ s] . . . in restraint of 
trade."15 All contracts restrain trade in some sense, though; that is the point 
of contract. 16 As a result, a literal interpretation of the Sherman Act would 
explode society into "individual atoms," destroying the very commerce the 
Act was designed to enhanceY From the statute's inception, then, the Su-
preme Court has given the Act a "reasonable construction," voiding only 
those contracts that restrained commerce "directly."18 Ultimately this ap-
proach took the form of the "Rule of Reason," announced in Standard Oil 
15 See 15 U.S.C. § I (1890). 
16 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918) ("Every agreement con-
cerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence."); see 
also Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) (stipulating that mere restraint 
on trader autonomy does not suggest that an agreement "restrains trade" within the meaning of the Act). 
17 See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911); Nat'! Soc'y ofProfl Eng'rs 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) ("It is that body of law [i.e., contract law] that establishes the 
enforceability of commercial agreements and enables competitive markets-indeed, a competitive 
economy-to function effectively."); see also Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc. 776 F.2d 185, 188 
(7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) ("The war of all against all is not a good model for any economy. 
Antitrust law is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to require 
all economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment."); N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 
411 ( 1904) (Holmes, J ., dissenting) ("I am happy to know that only a minority of my brethren adopt an 
interpretation of the law that would make eternal the bellum omnium contra omnes and disintegrate 
society so far as it could into individual atoms. If this were [Congress'] intent I should regard calling 
such a law a regulation of commerce as a mere pretense. It would be an attempt to reconstruct soci-
ety."). 
18 See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) ("The Act of Congress must 
have a reasonable construction, or else there would scarcely be an agreement or contract among busi-
ness men that could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, 
and possibly to restrain it.") (quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898); id. (stating 
that the Sherman Act forbids only those contracts that restrain trade directly); Hopkins, I 7 I U.S. at 592-
600 (same); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Co., 166 U.S. 290,329 (1897) (suggesting that a cove-
nant ancillary to the sale of a business would not "restrain trade" within the meaning of the Act, despite 
the agreement's restrictive impact.); see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of 
Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 77, 83-84 [hereinafter Meese, Price Theory]; Alan J. Meese, Liberty and 
Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B. U. L. REv. I (1999) [hereinafter Meese, Liberty and Antitrust]. 
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v. United States and reaffirmed several times since. 19 As Standard Oil put 
it, the Sherman Act did not ban "normal" or "ordinary" contracts, but in-
stead only those that "unduly" restrained the course of trade.20 Several sub-
sequent decisions have reaffirmed and elaborated Standard Oil's Rule of 
Reason.21 Courts have taken a similar approach when applying Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, which forbids monopolization and attempts to monopo-
lize.22 While the "plain meaning" of the statute might seem to ban any prac-
tice that leads to monopoly, courts have repeatedly held that it forbids only 
those practices or restraints that interfere with rivalry unreasonably.Z3 
The statutory ban on "unreasonable" restraints did not empower courts 
to apply their own views of political economy when determining whether a 
restraint is "reasonable."24 On the contrary, Standard Oil and its Rule of 
Reason presupposes a fixed normative conception of what does and does 
not make a contract "unreasonable."25 As the Court put it, the Rule of Rea-
son requires courts to void only those restraints that produce "the same re-
sult as monopoly."26 Moreover, the Court mentioned three such results: 
supra-competitive prices, reduced output, and poor quality.27 As then-
Professor Bork pointed out nearly four decades ago, this test was phrased in 
"wholly economic terms"; it did not empower courts to void restraints or 
other transactions that merely offended a court's political or social sensi-
bilities. 28 
19 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see also Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 
passim (reaffirming and elaborating Standard Oil's Rule of Reason); N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 361 
(Brewer, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Sherman Act does not reach reasonable re-
straints of trade). 
20 See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 57-62; Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 179-180 (Rule of Reason 
announced in Standard Oil does not forbid "normal" or ''usual" restraints but only those that "unduly" 
restrict competition or the course of trade). 
21 See, e.g., Nat'/ Soc'y of Prof'/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 681; Cont'l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 49-59; 
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238-41; see also Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 460-61 
(1927) (opining that Rule of Reason articulated by Standard Oil was consistent with previous case law). 
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890). 
23 See Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at passim. 
24 See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 65; see also Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282-83. 
25 See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18, at 83-89. 
26 See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 52, 61. 
27 See id. at 52 (describing evils of monopoly as the power to fix prices, deteriorating quality, and 
the power to limit output); see also Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 237-38, 
244-46 (1899) (finding horizontal price fixing a direct restraint of trade where it produced prices above 
the competitive level). 
28 See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing And Market 
Division, 74 YALE L. J. 775, 802-05 (1965) [hereinafter Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division]. 
Accord Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18, at 86-89; Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 18, at 
passim (formative era courts rejected arguments that Sherman Act furthered individual "liberty" in the 
form of"freedom" from otherwise reasonable contractual restraints). 
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Standard Oil's invocation of the common law and its Rule of Reason 
has major implications for the role of economic theory in antitrust adjudica-
tion. Contracts do not announce their consequences on their face; some fact 
finder must gather data to determine whether, in fact, the arrangement does 
or will produce monopoly or its consequences.29 In so doing, the fact finder 
must avoid the impulse to assemble any and all information that might, a 
priori, seem to bear upon the restraint's impact. Instead, like any other sci-
entist, the finder of fact must gather only those facts that theory deems rele-
vant?0 In this process, theory tells the investigator what questions to ask 
and how to measure and categorize the answers.31 
Any admonition to employ economic theory begs the obvious ques-
tion: What theory? Under one view, sometimes embraced by the courts, 
judges should apply the economic theory that was in place when Congress 
passed the Sherman Act.32 Under this view, a contract deemed unreason-
able in 1890 should be deemed unreasonable for all time, or at least until 
Congress itself intervenes.33 Any other approach, it is said, would contra-
vene the will of Congress and thus constitute unjustified judicial activism. 34 
If taken seriously, however, such an approach would yield results that 
few would applaud. 35 In 1890, when the Sherman Act was passed, most 
economists believed that purely private cartels could not price above the 
competitive level without immediately attracting entry that would restore 
29 See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 52, 61 (finding that the Sherman Act forbids those contracts that 
produce "monopoly or its consequences"). 
30 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 59-61 (1962) [hereinafter 
KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS] (explaining that background expectations lintit the type of data that a 
scientist may find); Ronald H. Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. !NSTITIITIONAL AND 
THEORETICAL ECON. 229 (1984) (chiding institutional econontists for gathering a mass of facts with no 
theory to guide them as to what was relevant). 
31 KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 30, at 57-61; Thomas S. Kuhn, The Function of 
Measurement in Modern Physical Science, in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN 
SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE, 178, 195-96 (1977) (explaining how revised theories led chentists 
to revise empirical techniques to measure that which theory deemed relevant). 
32 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10-11 nn.l5-16 (1985) (con-
tending that courts should not take issue with Congress' purported determination in the Federal Trade 
Comntission Act that tying contracts are presumptively manifestations of market power). 
33 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (misreading Standard Oil 
to hold that Rule of Reason permanently forbids all contracts that were unenforceable at common law). 
34 See, e.g., id. ("As to [certain] classes of restraints ... Congress had deterntined its own criteria 
of public harm."); see also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 10-11 nn.l5-16; id at 32 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (finding no reason for the Court to revise a longstanding interpretation of the Sherman Act when 
normal practice is for such revisions to come from Congress); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 
457 U.S. 332, 354-55 (1982) (once the Court announces a per se rule, only Congress can repeal it). 
35 See Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the 
Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337,372-73 (2000) (explaining how effective antitrust courts "must 
be able to match regulation to new learning and current values"). 
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competitive conditions.36 A modem court that wished to remain faithful to 
this theory would review naked price fixing agreements on a case-by-case 
basis, voiding only those that produced "unreasonable" prices.37 Indeed, 
many common law courts applied just such a rule when the statute was 
passed.38 Such an approach, would of course, require a rejection of the per 
se rule against horizontal price fixing, a rule that nearly all commentators 
embrace.39 
There is, however, an alternative approach, an approach more in keep-
ing with the statute's invocation of the common law term "restraint of 
trade." At common law, the term "restraint of trade" was not frozen in time, 
forever hostile or forgiving to a particular list of prohibited contracts. In-
stead, the term "restraint of trade" referred to contracts that produced a par-
ticular economic consequence, given the economic conditions and theories 
of the day.40 As a result, courts adjusted the definition of"restraint of trade" 
as economic conditions and theories changed.41 The better reasoned deci-
36 See Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 18, at 15-18 (1999); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE, 60 (2d ed. 1999) [herein-
after HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY] ("[M]ost traditional economists condemned the 
statute as at best irrelevant and at worst harmful."). 
37 See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 235-38 (invoking factual findings that agreement produced 
unreasonable prices to support holding that cartel restrained trade "directly"); see also United States v. 
Nelson, 52 F. 646 (C.C.D. Minn. 1892) (dismissing Sherman Act indictment against lumber cartel 
because participants made no attempt to exclude competitors from the market). 
38 Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522 ( 1880) (enforcing cartel agreement that bound 
only a portion of the market's participants because there was no showing that the participants had the 
power to set unreasonable prices); see also Dolph v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co, 28 F. 553 (C.C.N.D. 
N.Y.) (endorsing per se ban on horizontal price fixing). See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937 (1990) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND 
AMERICAN LAW] (collecting and discussing common law decisions that took such an approach). 
39 See HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 255 (1985). 
40 Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) (stating that the original rules governing 
restraints of trade were "made under a condition of things and a state of society, different from those 
which now prevail, [with the result that] the rule laid down is not regarded as inflexible, and has been 
considerably modified"); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421-22 (N.Y. 1887) (changing 
economic conditions required changed definition of "restraint of trade"); Skrainka, 8 Mo. App. at 525 
("It is not that contracts in restraint of trade are any more legal or enforceable now than they were at any 
former period, but that courts look differently [now] at the question as to what is a restraint of trade."); 
Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 139-41 (Wis. 1851) (same). See also Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. 
Winsor, 87 U.S. 64, 66,68 (1873) (suggesting flexibility in per se ban on "general restraint[s] of trade" 
because "[ c ]ases must be judged according to their circumstances, and can only be rightly judged when 
the reason and grounds of the rule are carefully considered"). There were, it should be noted, some 
exceptions to this dynamic approach. See Union Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 61 N.E. 1038, 1040 (Ill. 
1901) (declining to depart from common law ban on general restraints of trade despite changed eco-
nomic theories and conditions). 
41 See Diamond Match Co., 13 N.E. at 420-22. See also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55-58 (describ-
ing prior evolution of statutory and common law in response to changes in economic theory). 
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sions of the Supreme Court have taken just such an approach, even overrul-
ing precedents when evolving economic theory reveals that the economic 
premises of such decisions are incorrect.42 Courts have applied such an 
approach for most of the Sherman Act's history, translating the normative 
premises of the Sherman Act in light of new information about the eco-
nomic impact of various arrangements.43 Such an approach implements the 
full meaning of the term "restraint of trade" and furthers Congress's appar-
ent expectation that antitrust courts proceed in a common law fashion.44 
Similar considerations suggest an equally flexible approach when interpret-
ing and applying other antitrust statutes.45 
42 See State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (Congress "expected the courts to give shape to 
the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common law tradition") (internal citations omitted); id. at 
21-22 (discarding per se rule against maximum resale price maintenance because advances in economic 
theory supposedly undermined the premises behind such a rule); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Co., 
485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) ("The Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dy-
namic potential. It invokes the common law itself and not merely the static content that the common law 
assigned that term in 1890."); Nat'/ Soc'y of Prof'/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688 ("The legislative history 
makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by draw-
ing on common-law tradition."); Cant'/ TV., 433 U.S. at 57-59 (1977) (relying upon advances in eco-
nomic theory to justify repudiation of per se rule against location clauses and exclusive territories). 
43 See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18, at 89-92, 141-44; HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND 
AMERICAN LAW, supra note 38, at 268 ("One of the great myths about American antitrust policy is that 
courts began to adopt an 'economic approach' to antitrust problems only in the 1970's [sic). At most, 
this 'revolution' in antitrust policy represented a change in economic models. Antitrust policy has been 
forged by economic ideology since its inception."); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative 
Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 226 (1995) ("In almost every era of antitrust 
history, policymakers have employed economic models to explain or modify the state of the law and the 
rationale for its enforcement."); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity In Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 
1165, 1247-51 (1993) (describing such an approach to interpretation and application of the Sherman 
Act). 
44 See Khan. 522 U.S. at 20-21 (Congress meant courts to take common law approach to the 
Sherman Act); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. 7, 
48 (1966) (concluding that Congress intended the courts to adjust antitrust doctrine in response to 
changes in economic theory); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. 
REv. 705, 706-707 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Ratchet in Antitrust] (courts should proceed in 
common law fashion when implementing the Act). Cf Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 
(1952) ("Where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and mean-
ing of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to 
each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will con-
vey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed."); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Read-
ing of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1947) ("If a word is obviously transplanted from another 
legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings its soil with it."). 
45 See ROBERT H. BORK, niE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, 48-49, 57-
71 (1993) [hereinafter BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX). 
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B. Economic Theory in the Executive Branch 
Courts do not have a monopoly when it comes to applying economic 
theory under the Sherman Act or other antitrust statutes. For one thing, 
Congress itself can always revise the statute, overruling decisions that rest 
upon economic premises that Congress deems to be false, although Con-
gress has rarely exercised this supervisory power.46 Far more important in 
the administration of the Sherman Act, though, is the power of the agencies 
to apply evolving economic theories when deciding how to enforce the Act. 
After all, courts are not the only governmental bodies that "adjudicate," i.e., 
gather facts and apply law.47 Agencies must also adjudicate when, for in-
stance, deciding whether to challenge a trade restraint.48 Like courts, the 
president and other executive officers are bound faithfully to execute "the 
law," including the Sherman Act's ban on restraints of trade.49 If, as the 
Supreme Court has said, the term "restraint of trade" has a "dynamic poten-
tial,"50 then faithful execution of the law would seem to require the execu-
tive branch, like the courts, to take account of changes in economic theory 
when making enforcement decisions. 51 Any other approach would create a 
strangely bifurcated statute: enforcement agencies blindly pursuing hide-
bound doctrines based on outmoded theories, while courts produced evolv-
ing doctrines based on the latest theoretical innovation. Absent concrete 
evidence that Congress intended such a schizoid enforcement scheme, en-
forcement agencies should be full partners with the courts when it comes to 
applying evolving economic theory. 
Indeed, if anything, executive agencies should be more inclined to 
employ evolving economic theory when determining enforcement posi-
tions. After all, the agencies possess expertise and institutional memory that 
46 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000} (banning exclusive dealing contracts that substantially lessen 
competition or tend to monopoly). 
47 See Freytag v. Comm'r of the IRS, 501 U.S. 868,909-910 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
result) (explaining that executive officials "adjudicate" when applying federal law to particular contro-
versies}; Frank H. Easterbrook, "Success" and the Judicial Power, 65 IND. L. J. 277, 280 (1990) 
(same); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2000) (promulgating standards govern-
ing "adjudication" by administrative law judges in the executive branch). 
48 See William Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Common Law 
Nature of Antitrust, 60 TEx. L. REV. 661, 686-87 (1982) [hereinafter Baxter, Separation of Powers]. 
49 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (President must "take care that the laws [are] faithfully executed"). 
See also Baxter, Separation of Powers, supra note 48, at 673-78 (stating that take care clause requires 
executive officers to employ common law approach when enforcing the Sherman Act). 
50 See Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 732. 
51 See Baxter, Separation of Powers, supra note 48, at 677-78; see also Easterbrook, Ratchet in 
Antitrust, supra note 44, at 711 (concluding that enforcement agencies may refuse to file an entire class 
of cases authorized by existing precedent where agencies believe economic premises of such decisions 
to be incorrect). 
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courts lack.52 Very few judges are economists or, for that matter, particu-
larly schooled in antitrust. By contrast, the Federal Trade Commission, for 
instance, employs scores of economists, lawyers, and Commissioners with 
more than a passing interest in antitrust law.53 Moreover, to the extent that 
"updating" a policy to incorporate economic theory may appear "political," 
agencies are better positioned to bear any illegitimacy costs that may result 
from reversing course. 54 At the very least, then, courts and agencies should 
be co-equal partners when it comes to applying evolving economic theory 
to antitrust problems within their respective jurisdictions. 55 
The arguments for dynamic executive interpretation of the Sherman 
Act make perfect sense in the abstract. Still, if taken seriously, a framework 
that allows two branches to make independent judgments about the eco-
nomic impact of various restraints will inevitably produce conflict, or at 
least conflicting views. So, for instance, the Supreme Court could declare 
that a certain practice is analyzed under the Rule of Reason, and thus pre-
sumptively lawful. At the same time, the agencies may believe that the 
practice is "always or almost always" anti-competitive and utterly lacking 
in redeeming virtue and should therefore be unlawful per se. 56 Or, the 
branches could "switch places," with the Court deciding that a particular 
practice is unlawful per se, while the agencies take a more charitable ap-
proach. 57 While the statutory scheme seems to invite these sorts of dis-
agreements, nothing in the Sherman Act or any other antitrust statute re-
veals who should prevail when such disagreement takes place. 
Still, the nature of the separation of powers renders one of the conflicts 
mentioned above a false one. After all, so long as there is judicial review of 
agency action, that is, so long as courts must enforce any decision to inter-
fere with liberty or property, the agencies cannot credibly maintain a pos-
ture that is more hostile to particular contracts or transactions than that 
52 Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antifnlst Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L. J. 305, 306 
(1987) ("Judges are not selected for business acumen."); id. at 310-13. 
53 Indeed, several FTC Commissioners have been leading economists or antitrust scholars in their 
own right. 
54 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (where 
statute is ambiguous, politically-accountable agencies, and not the courts, should resolve competing 
policy choices); see also Alan J. Meese, Economic Theory, Trader Freedom, And Consumer Welfare, 
84 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 789-92 (contending that, when generating antitrust doctrine, courts attempt to 
avoid the appearance that they are making a policy choice); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 
65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1365, 1387 (1997) (contending that courts suffer so-called "illegitimacy costs" 
when they appear to act for non-legal reasons). 
55 See Baxter, Separation of Powers, supra note 48, at 687-88. 
56 SeeN. Poe. Ry., 356 U.S. I, 5-6 (1958) (articulating this approach to determining whether a 
contract is unlawful per se ). 
57 See infra notes 91-92 (describing several such instances). 
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taken by the courts. 58 Nor could Congress constitutionally subject judicial 
decisions to administrative revision, or revise such decisions itself.59 So 
long as courts have "the last word," then, the agencies cannot credibly 
maintain enforcement positions that are more aggressive than judicial 
precedents warrant. 
What, though, about the other hypothetical mentioned above, that is, 
where the agencies stake out a position less aggressive than that taken by 
the courts? What if, for instance, judicial precedent declares that minimum 
resale price maintenance is unlawful per se, while the agencies believe that 
such restraints are best adjudicated under the Rule of Reason?60 By declin-
ing to bring enforcement actions in a particular class of cases, the agency 
can effectively nullify judicial precedents, unless private parties can make 
credible threats to bring private actions.61 Such actions, of course, have 
recently become a comparative rarity, given the numerous precedents nar-
rowing the definition of "antitrust injury" for which plaintiffs may seek 
redress under the antitrust laws.62 According to one, "judicial supremacy" 
model, however, the agencies are "duty bound" to continue enforcing 
judge-made rules, even when they firmly believe the economic premises of 
58 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (2000) (empowering private parties to seek judicial review of FTC or-
ders); 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (empowering United States Attorneys to enforce Sherman Act in federal 
court); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (when reviewing agency action, 
"the court shall decide all relevant questions of law"); see also William E. Kovacic, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 
377, 398-99 (2003) (describing how judicial decisions disapproving agency enforcement efforts led 
agencies to adopt less aggressive positions in some instances). 
59 See Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (Congress may not authorize executive 
branch officials to revise judicial decisions); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 
(1995) (Congress may not itself revise final judgments). 
60 See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (minimum resale price maintenance ("rpm") 
unlawful per se); see also Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (affirming 
judgment by lower court that minimum resale price arrangement was an unreasonable restraint of trade). 
This example is by no means hypothetical, of course. During the Reagan Administration, the Antitrust 
Division took the position that longstanding precedent declaring minimum rpm unlawful per se should 
be overruled. See, e.g., Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761, n.7 (1984) (noting the 
Division's argument but declining to consider it since the defendant had not raised it). 
61 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 157, 176-81 (1996) 
(explaining that an agency's consistent failure to enforce a particular rule can effectively alter content of 
regulation faced by private firms); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (an agency's failure 
to take enforcement action is "committed to agency discretion by law" and thus not subject to judicial 
review). 
62 See Atlantic Richfield, Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (finding that a dealer 
does not suffer antitrust injwy where manufacturer requires competing dealers to charge low, nonpreda-
tory prices); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (rejecting claim that a vertical 
merger caused competitor antitrust injwy). 
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such rules to be false. 63 Any other approach, it is said, would contravene the 
will of Congress and offend the separation ofpowers. 64 
The judicial supremacy model simply begs the question: what is the 
will of Congress on this subject? As noted earlier, nothing in the antitrust 
statutes purports to require the agencies to "toe the line" once the courts 
announce a particular doctrine.65 Perhaps the Congress of 1890 believed 
that the Executive branch, which includes the enforcement agencies, is co-
equal with the courts, and thus empowered to interpret federal law. 66 In the 
same way, of course, the President (and Congress) are empowered to take 
an independent view of the meaning of the Constitution. 67 Just as Abraham 
Lincoln was free to decline to enforce the rule announced in Dred Scott, so 
too, it would seem, can Ronald Reagan decline to enforce the rule of Dr. 
Miles. 68 
63 See, e.g., Jill Boylston Herndon & John E. Lopatka, Managed Care and the Questionable 
Relevance of Maricopa, 44 Antitrust Bull. 11 7, 141 ( 1999) ("The agencies were not free to adopt an 
approach directly contrary to that suggested in Maricopa; their obligation, after all, is to enforce the law 
as set down authoritatively by the courts."); John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration's Antitrust 
Policy, "Original Intent" and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 Antitrust Bull. 259 (1988); 
Sanford M. Litvack, Government Antitrust Policy: Theory Versus Practice and the Role of the Antitrust 
Division, 60 TEX. L. REv. 649, 651-52, 655-60 (1982); John F. Seiberling, Congress Makes Laws; The 
Executive Should Enforce Them, 53 ANTITRUSTL.J. 175 (1984). 
64 See, e.g., John J. Flynn, "Reaganomics" and Antitrust Enforcement: A Jurisprudential Cri-
tique, 1983 Utah L. Rev. 269 (1983); Litvack, supra note 63, at 651-52, 655-60; Seiberling, supra note 
63, at 176-79. 
65 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
66 One court argues that Congress' determination that courts must review agency determinations 
that a firm has violated the antitrust laws suggests that Congress had in mind a judicial supremacy 
model, with the result that agencies should enforce without question any rules enforced by courts. This 
argument would rest upon a false symmetry between agency action and inaction, however. Insofar as 
agency action interferes with private liberty, Congress may well have believed that all three branches 
must agree before a court can declare a firm in violation of the antitrust laws. See Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Presidential Review, 40 CASE WES. L. REv. 905,927 (1990) (separation of powers ensures that all three 
branches must agree before the state brings coercive force to bear). 
67 See id.; James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893); see also Neal Devins & Lcuis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and 
Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REv. 83 (1998) (explaining how interbranch dialogue about the meaning 
of the Constitution produces better and more durable constitutional rules). 
68 See Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial Opinions, 61 
TULANE L. REV. 1041, 1050-61 (1987). President Lincoln summarized this view in his first inaugural 
address: 
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions 
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, ... 
the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned 
their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. 
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861 ), in Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of 
the United States, S. Doc. No. 101-10, at 139 (1989). James Madison held similar views: 
As the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of the United States are co-ordinate, 
and each equally bound to support the Constitution, it follows that each must, in the exercise 
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Even if the judicial supremacy approach is attractive as a theoretical 
matter, the enforcement agencies have often departed from such an ap-
proach in practice. As Donald Turner put it while serving as head of the 
Antitrust Division, the overriding mission of the enforcement agencies is 
not simply to bring every case that the government can win under existing 
precedent. Instead, he said, the agencies must bring those cases that it 
should win, under their best view of economic theory.69 Turner certainly 
followed his own advice, as did subsequent enforcement chiefs at both the 
DOJ and FTC. The law of mergers provides a useful microcosm of this 
approach. For instance, decisions of the Warren Court in the 1960s declared 
horizontal mergers presumptively unlawful, without regard to market struc-
ture, whenever there was a "trend towards concentration" in the relevant 
industry.70 In so doing, the Court equated a trend toward "concentration" 
with any "total decrease in the number of separate competitors," without 
regard to economic concentration as measured by market shares.71 Indeed, 
in one decision the Court held that definition of the product and geographic 
market was unnecessary to establish a prima facie case against a merger, 
of its functions, be guided by the text of the Constitution according to its own interpretation 
of it; and, consequently, that in the event of irreconcilable interpretations, the prevalence of 
the one or the other department must depend on the nature of the case, as receiving its final 
decision from one or the other, and passing from that decision into effect, without involving 
the functions of any other. 
James Madison, Unaddressed Letter of 1834, in 4 LEITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF ]AMES MADISON 
349 (Philadelphia, J .B. Lippincott & Co. ed., 1867). 
69 Donald Turner, Address to the American Bar Association, I 0 ANTITRUST BULL. 685, 686 
(1965) [hereinafter Turner, Address to the American Bar Association] (emphasis in the original). As 
Turner put it: 
!d. 
"It is the duty of the Department of Justice, not to bring a case simply on the basis that it 
thinks it can win, but to bring only those cases that it thinks it should win. It is our duty to do 
the best we can in determining appropriate interpretations of the law, and in assisting the 
courts in creating rational body of antitrust law by seeking to win cases only on the basis of 
legal propositions which the Government believes to be sound, on the basis of the best 
thought it can bring to bear. I believe that it is important that the Government accept this ob-
ligation with particular seriousness when it brings antitrust cases." 
70 In United States v. Von's Grocery Co., for instance, the Court declared a merger between two 
small grocery chains unlawful even though: I) over 3,000 grocery stores remained in the relevant mar-
ket after the merger and 2) the entry of ISO new stores in the previous five years established the absence 
of barriers to entry. 384 U.S. 270, 273 (1966). Similarly, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court 
voided a merger between two firms, one with a 4% share of the market and another with a 0.5% share of 
the market; all in all there were 800 firms in the relevant market. 370 U.S. 294, 340-346 (1962); see 
also id. at 345 (invoking "history of tendency toward concentration" in support of decision). 
71 See Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. at 273, n.3 (chiding district court for relying upon indices of 
economic concentration based on market shares when all that should have mattered was the "steady 
decline in the number of individual grocery store owners"); cf id. at 280-81 (White, J., concurring) 
(invoking market shares and concentration ratios to justifY result, but not reasoning, of Court's deci-
sion). 
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given a trend toward fewer rivals in the industry. 72 Similarly, decisions of 
the same era banned vertical mergers that "foreclosed" rivals from a trivial 
share of the dealing capacity in the relevant market, without regard to the 
presence or not of barriers to entry.73 During the same period, the Supreme 
Court opined that productive efficiencies could not justify an otherwise 
anti-competitive merger.74 
Nonetheless, merger guidelines promulgated in 1968 by Turner's An-
titrust Division rejected numerous aspects of then-current case law.75 For 
instance, the Guidelines treated the definition of relevant markets as an 
essential ingredient in any merger analysis.76 The guidelines also adopted a 
definition of concentration that the Supreme Court had rejected just two 
years earlier, refusing to challenge mergers unless they resulted in an in-
72 See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966): 
Apparently the District Court thought that in order to show a violation of§ 7 it was essential 
for the Government to show a 'relevant geographic market' in the same way the corpus 
delicti must be proved to establish a crime. But ... [t]he language of this section requires 
merely that the Government prove the merger may have a substantial anti-competitive effect 
somewhere in the United States .... This phrase does not call for the delineation of a 'sec-
tion of the country' by metes and bounds as a surveyor would Jay off a plot of ground. 
73 See. e.g., Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323-34; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. United States, 231 F. 
Supp. 955, 100-104, ajf'd, 381 U.S. 414 (1965) (voiding merger between supplier and finn that pur-
chased and resold less than two percent of the industry's output); In reA. G. Spalding & Bros., 56 
F.T.C. 1125 (1960) (voiding merger because it foreclosed competing sellers from distributing through 
sales force of one competitor). 
74 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) ("Possible economies cannot be 
used as a defense to illegality."). But see, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 
7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. R. 381,402-13 (1980) [hereinaefter Muris, Efficiency De-
fense] (examining the Court's anti-efficiency jurisprudence and concluding that the Court never 
squarely held that efficiencies were irrelevant in merger analysis). It should be noted that the agencies 
led the assault against efficiencies, even going so far as to argue that the prospect of efficiencies mili-
tated against a transaction. See id. at 403-04 (describing government's extensive argument in Brown 
Shoe that transaction would create efficiencies and that such efficiencies militated against the traosac-
tion). 
75 See Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 
ANTITRUST L. J. 105, 108-09 (2002) ("[l]t is significant that the government acknowledged any limita-
tions on its discretion [in the 1968 Guidelines] when it seemingly could win any merger case it wanted. 
Turner has never been given sufficient credit for what some at the time considered to be an act of con-
siderable moral courage."). 
76 See U.S. OEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES§ 3.0 (1968), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 
(CCH) 'IJI3,101 [hereinafter 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES] ("A rational appraisal of the probable com-
petitive effects of a merger normally requires definition of one or more relevant markets."); cf Von's 
Grocery, 384 U.S. at 273 n.3 (rejecting the trial court's economic definition of concentration in favor of 
definition based on sheer number of firms). While the Guidelines did state that a determination of con-
centration was "normally" required to evaluate a merger, the Guidelines went on to provide that defini-
tion of relevant markets and determination of market shares was necessary in all cases. See 1968 
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra, at §§ 4-7; see also Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. at 561-62 (Fortas, J., 
concurring in the result) (concluding that market definition and determination of concentration was a 
necessary element in all merger litigation). 
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crease in economic concentration as measured by market shares. 77 Subse-
quent merger guidelines also adopted an "economic" conception of concen-
tration.78 
At the same time, the 1968 Merger Guidelines required proof that a 
vertical merger foreclosed six percent of the relevant market before the 
Department would consider a challenge.79 In this way, the Guidelines em-
braced a market share threshold significantly higher than that mandated by 
the then-current case law.80 Moreover, proof of such foreclosure did not 
automatically doom a merger in the government's eyes; merging parties 
could still avoid a challenge if they could establish the absence of barriers 
to entry, even if the transaction exceeded the market share thresholds set by 
the guidelines.81 By 1982, moreover, the Department of Justice had entirely 
abandoned any effort to enforce the Court's vertical merger jurisprudence.82 
In the same year the Federal Trade Commission announced that the pres-
ence of efficiencies militated against an enforcement action.83 Two years 
77 See 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 76, at § 7.0 (proof that a merger leads to increased 
economic concentration necessary to establish a prima facie case). 
78 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES§ 1.5 (1992) (rev'd 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,104, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelineslhoriz_book/toc.html [hereinafter 1992 MERGER 
GUIDELINES]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.4 (1984), 
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,103, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.htm [hereinafter 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES]; U.S. 
FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENT OF THE FTC CONCERNING HORIZONTAL MERGERS§§ II, VI (1982) 
[hereinafter !982 FTC STATEMENT]. 
79 See 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 76, at§§ 11-13. 
80 See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 327-34 (finding vertical merger unlawful where transaction "fore-
closed" other manufacturers from 2-3% of the nation's shoe stores); cf FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 
U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966) (observing that the Federal Trade Commission Act bestowed upon the FTC 
broad powers "with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of the Serman and 
Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually violate these laws"). 
81 /d. 
82 See 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at§ IVB (articulating possible theories of anti-
competitive harm without mentioning "foreclosure"). 
83 See 1982 FTC STATEMENT, supra note 78, at§ IV (Commission will consider efficiencies as a 
matter of enforcement discretion); see also In reAm. Med. lnt'l, 104 F.T.C. I, 213-19 (1984) (finding 
that efficiencies that are passed on to consumers can justifY otherwise unlawful mergers). To be sure, 
the Commission at least took the strange position that courts could not consider efficiencies when 
determining whether a merger substantially lessens competition. See FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 
F.2d 1206, 1222 (lith Cir. 1991) (recounting Commission's argument that presence of efficiencies is 
irrelevant as a legal matter); Memorandum in Support of Plaintifrs Motions for Preliminary Injunctions 
at 41-43, FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998) (Nos. 98-595, 98-596); 1982 
FTC STATEMENT, supra note 78, at §IV; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust 
Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 729-31 (1977) (proposing that agencies but not courts con-
sider efficiencies when adjudicating mergers). 
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later, the Department of Justice followed suit.84 While enforcement officials 
attempted to justify such approaches as faithful interpretations of interven-
ing decisions, it is very hard to escape the conclusion that these officials 
simply thought much of the Warren era case law was wrong, as a matter of 
law and economics.85 Put more charitably, enforcement officials "trans-
lated" those decisions, as well as the Clayton Act, in light of subsequent 
developments in economic theory.86 
The agencies' "dynamic" approach to judicial precedent has not been 
confined to the merger context. Again during the Warren era, the Supreme 
Court interpreted Section 3 of the Clayton Act to ban any exclusive dealing 
contract that bound more than six percent of a market's dealers. 87 Similar 
decisions arose under the FTC Act, which, according to the Court simply 
implemented the policy of the Sherman Act. 88 While somewhat dated, the 
Court has never questioned these decisions, let alone overruled them. 89 
Needless to say, however, the enforcement agencies do not challenge each 
84 See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at § 3.5. 
85 See William F. Baxter, Responding To The Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CAL. L. REv. 
619, 620 (1983) [hereinafter Baxter, The Draftman's View] (rejecting Brown Shoe's suggestion that 
non-economic values are relevant in merger litigation); see also CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, 
ANTITRUST POLICY 133 (1959) (concluding that a vertical merger should be prima facie unlawful if the 
acquiring firm has twenty percent of its markets); id. (concluding that absence of barriers to entry 
should shield mergers involving smaller firms from challenge); Donald I. Baker and William Blumen-
thal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 311 (1983). Some have suggested that 
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), justifies the more relaxed approach to 
mergers reflected in the current guidelines. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw I 09-11 0 (2d ed. 
200 I). There the Court sustained a merger even though the resulting firm commanded over 50 percent 
of the relevant market. In particular, the Court held that the merger in question did not reduce rivalry 
that otherwise would have occurred because one of the merging firms had already agreed to sell its 
entire reserves of coal to numerous purchasers via long term contracts. The decision did not, however, 
signal a wholesale retreat from Von's Grocery or similar decisions. Indeed, General Dynamics cited 
Von's Grocery with approval for the proposition that the transaction was prima facie unlawful. See 
General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 494-98 (explaining that increase in concentration wrought by merger 
was similar to that wrought in Von's Grocery). At most, then, General Dynamics stands for the proposi-
tion that a defendant can rebut a prima facie case by showing that the transaction does not, in fact, 
reduce rivalry that otherwise would have occurred. 
86 See Baxter, The Drajiman 's View, supra note 85, at 618 (a purpose of the 1982 Merger Guide-
lines was to "bring the [ 1968] Guidelines into line with subsequent developments in antitrust law and 
economics."). 
87 See, e.g., United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), a.ff'd, 343 U.S. 
922 (1952). 
88 See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 230 {1968); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 
320-21 (1966) (holding that an exclusive dealing arrangement binding 1% of the nation's shoe retailers 
offended "the central policy of ... the Sherman Act" and thus violated section 5 of the FTC Act). 
89 Cf Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 330-35 (1961) (holding that exclu-
sive dealing contract did not violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act where agreement governed less than 
one percent of the relevant market). 
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and every exclusive dealing contract that governs six percent or more of a 
market's dealers.90 
Similar dynamism has characterized the agencies' approach to certain 
intraband restraints previously condemned under the Sherman Act. For 
instance, while the Warren court declared maximum resale price mainte-
nance unlawful per se in 1968, both enforcement agencies informed the 
Supreme Court in 1996 that they had never relied upon that doctrine in an 
enforcement action.91 Put another way, the agencies simply made no effort 
to enforce this rule, despite the open and notorious existence of such price 
fixing.92 
The agencies' willingness to embrace interpretations different from 
those announced by the courts did not always work in favor of defendants. 
In some instances enforcers have embraced doctrines more aggressive than 
those contained in the caselaw.93 In either event, both enforcement agencies 
have shown themselves willing to embrace their own view of the antitrust 
laws, based upon their own assessments of economic theory, even when 
such views are contrary to those entertained by the courts. 
90 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELJI\'ES § 3.22 (1985), reprinted in 4 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 13, I 05 (proof of significant market concentration necessary to finding that 
exclusive dealing contract is unlawful); In re Bellone Elecs. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 197-218 (1982) 
(abandoning stringent tests for exclusive dealing apparently mandated by previous judicial decisions). 
To be sure, the Clinton administration withdrew the Department's Vertical Restraints Guidelines. None-
theless, this withdrawal did not signal a wholesale embrace of the inhospitality tradition. 
91 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); see also Brief for the United States and the 
FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal at 24-25, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (No. 96-
871) ("Since Albrecht, we are aware of no case in which either the Commission or the United States has 
committed enforcement resources to proceeding [sic] against a party on the ground of purely vertical 
maximum price fixing."); Khan, 522 U.S. at 18-19 (relying in part on this representation to overrule 
Albrecht). 
92 For instance, in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. U.S.A. Petroleum Co., the Court held that a plaintiff 
had not established "antitrust injury" and thus could not maintain a private action against parties to such 
an agreement. 495 U.S. 328 ( 1990). Although it must have been aware of the agreement in question, 
given the pendency of the private lawsuit against it, the United States did not challenge this conduct, 
which was per se unlawful at the time. See also Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Akti-
engessellschaft, 19 F.3d 745 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that dealer subject to maximum resale price main-
tenance suffered "antitrust injury" compensable under the Sherman Act). 
93 Compare United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001) (rejecting argu-
ment by United States that above-cost pricing was predatory), affd, 335 F.3d 1109 (lOth Cir. 2003), with 
Atlanta Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 328 (below-cost pricing necessary element of predation claim), and 
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117-118 n.12 (1986) (declining to consider 
"whether above cost pricing with predatory intent is ever sufficient to state a claim of predation."). 
Compare a/so In re Russell Stover, 100 FTC I, 16-34 (1982) (finding resale price maintenance despite 
absence of agreement between parties), with United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (hold-
ing that a manufacture may terminate a dealer for price-cutting absent an agreement between them). 
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Of course, no one believes that the Supreme Court would reaffirm the 
various extreme decisions of the Warren era.94 One could therefore charac-
terize the agencies' approach as reflecting attempts to predict what the Su-
preme Court would do if presented with the most recent developments in 
economic theory. But, such prediction ultimately rests upon the enforcer's 
best view of the economic effects of particular arrangements, a view the 
agencies would naturally impute to the courts.95 As both a theoretical and 
practical matter, then, the agencies would seem to possess the authority to 
decline to enforce doctrines announced by the courts. 
II. ECONOMIC THEORY AND EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS CONTRACTS: A 
SHORT HISTORY 
As explained above, the Sherman Act requires the courts and en-
forcement officials to apply the best available economic theory when gen-
erating antitrust doctrine. If we assume that officials and judges faithfully 
discharge their duties, then one might expect to find a correlation between 
mainstream economic theory, on the one hand, and enforcement and judi-
cial decisions, on the other. An examination of the last several decades re-
veals just such a correlation, albeit a rough one. In particular, executive and 
judicial officials have generated enforcement policy and case law that gen-
erally tracks, with some lag, changes in economic theory. 
Still, this correlation has not been perfect, particularly when it comes 
to doctrine and policy governing exclusionary rights contracts. While the 
past few decades have witnessed rapid advances in economic theory rele-
vant to exclusionary rights agreements, the agencies and courts have been 
reluctant to incorporate some of these advances into enforcement policy 
and law. On the one hand, these actors have been receptive to arguments 
that exclusionary rights contracts harm competition by raising rivals' costs. 
On the other hand, both the agencies and the courts continue to embrace 
some doctrines that are vastly over inclusive under the Raising Rivals' 
Costs paradigm. Moreover, neither agencies nor courts have fully internal-
ized theoretical advances-notably transaction cost economics-suggesting 
that such restraints are usually pro-competitive. In particular, the enforce-
ment agencies have failed to integrate these advances into their doctrinal 
positions. As a result, the standards that agencies and courts currently apply 
94 See generally Cargill, 479 U.S. at 119, n.15 {noting in dicta that absence of barriers to entry 
undermines claim that competitor will suffer anti-competitive injury from post-merger predatory pric-
ing). 
95 Presumably, enforcement officials would assume that this could communicate their own eco-
nomic knowledge to the courts. 
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to such restraints are unduly hostile to them; the current regulatory land-
scape may well be inferior to a rule of per se legality for all forms of verti-
cal integration, including exclusionary rights agreements. In any event, 
enforcement agencies seeking to maximize social welfare must work harder 
to incorporate all advances in economic theory into their enforcement poli-
cies if they hope to use antitrust law as a tool to maximize consumer wel-
fare. 
A. Price Theory and the Inhospitality Tradition 
For at least three decades neoclassical price theory and the model of 
industrial organization that it spawned drove antitrust policy in the agencies 
and the courts.96 The enforcement agencies pursued the dictates of price 
theory with a vengeance, condemning various exclusionary rights agree-
ments in the process.97 An unabashed price theorist, Donald Turner, con-
cluded that the enforcement agencies should ignore the common law tradi-
tion and approach trade restraints "inhospitably."98 Both agencies obliged. 
For instance, both agencies deemed tying contracts imposed by firms with 
market power unlawful per se, without regard to any justification that de-
fendants might offer.99 While the per se rule was supposedly limited to in-
stances in which sellers had market power, the government took the posi-
96 I tell this story in much greater detail in Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18. 
97 Indeed, Professor Hovenkamp, a member of the Chicago School, has suggested that some of the 
government's enforcement positions fell outside the economic mainstream. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 36, at 68 ("Most of the over deterrent antitrust law based on innovative 
or even crackpot economic theories was made in cases brought by the United States Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission."); id. at 61 (noting that 1960s enforcement policy "may 
seem excessive even in light of [the era's dominant economic theory]"). 
98 The phrase "inhospitality tradition" apparently was coined by Professor Donald Turner, an 
economist who headed the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in the 1960s. According to 
Professor Turner "! approach territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law 
tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law." Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections on 
Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. I, 1-2 (1966). See also Jacobs, supra note 43, at 
227-28 (describing so-called Harvard School of industrial organization and antitrust policy during this 
period). Before serving as head of the antitrust division, Professor Turner co-authored the era's leading 
text on the relationship between economics and antitrust doctrine. See KA YSEN & Tu&'IER, supra note 
85; see also Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925,931 
(1979) [hereinafter Posner, Chicago School] (characterizing the Kaysen and Turner text as "the classic 
statement of the Harvard School"). 
99 See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I 
(1958). Decisions like Loew 's, inc. and N. Pac. Ry. predictably led to similar findings in the lower 
courts. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delights Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that fran-
chisor possessed economic power over franchisees because the former possessed a "distinctive" trade-
mark). 
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tion that any indication of product differentiation, including copyrights and 
trademarks, sufficed to establish such power. 100 Put another way, any de-
parture from perfect competition-including the very existence of such 
contracts-established the "economic power" sufficient to establish a per se 
violation. 101 The government showed similar hostility towards exclusive 
dealing contracts. In Standard Oil v. United States, for instance, the De-
partment of Justice challenged an arrangement that bound a mere 7% of the 
dealers in the relevant market. 102 Similarly, in United States v. Richfield Oil 
Corporation, the Department challenged an arrangement that locked up an 
even smaller proportion of the relevant dealers. 103 In both cases, the gov-
ernment argued that such agreements were unlawful per se if they fore-
closed competitors from a "substantial" portion of the market, defining 
"substantial" in purely quantitative terms. 104 Such agreements, the govern-
ment said, were "in their very nature in derogation of the concept of free 
competition in an 'open market. "'105 Not to be outdone, the FTC challenged 
arrangements involving truly trivial shares of the dealing market. In FTC v. 
Brown Shoe, for instance, the Commission challenged a non-exclusive 
dealing arrangement between Brown Shoe and a fraction of its dealers, be-
cause the arrangement "foreclosed" some other manufacturers from selling 
their products to such dealers. 106 The Commission did not bother to meas-
ure the extent of foreclosure-apparently 1% of the distribution market-
thinking it enough that the arrangement governed a large number of 
stores. 107 Defending the challenge in the Supreme Court, the Commission 
100 See Brief for the United States at 32-36, in Loew 's, 371 U.S. at 38 (No. 42) (arguing that pos-
session of a copyright conferred sufficient economic power to establish per se tying violation, regardless 
of the seller's share of a relevant market); In re Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp., 83 F.T.C. 575, 639 (1975) 
("The legal presumption of economic power long accorded to patented or copyrighted items . . . has 
been logically extended to encompass trademarks as well.") (citing Siegel, 448 F.2d at 49-50). 
I 01 See Brief for the United States at 15-16, N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. I (suggesting that the very exis-
tence of tying contracts established that sellers had the economic power necessary to impose them). 
102 See 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
103 See 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd. 343 U.S. 922 (1952). 
104 See Brief for the United States at 64-68, Richfield Oil Corp., 343 U.S. 922 (No. 395); Brief for 
the United States at 25-47, Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (No. 279). 
105 Brief for the United States at 26-27, Standard Oil, 337 U.S. 293 (No. 279). 
106 See In re Brown Shoe Inc., 62 F.T.C. 679 (1963), affd, FTC v. Brown Shoe, 384 U.S. 316, 
320, 321 (1966) (finding that such an agreement involving 1% of the nation's shoe retailers was an 
"unfair trade practice" in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act); see also In re Adolph Coors Co., 83 
F.T.C. 32, 196-200 (1973) (finding regional brewer's policy preventing dealers from distributing com-
petitor's keg beer offended the Clayton Act.); In re Dictograph Prods., Inc., 50 F.T.C. 281, 294-97 
(1953) (declaring exclusive dealing contract unlawful despite recent entry by competing manufacturers), 
affd, 217 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1954) ("It is the policy of the Congress that [the defendant's] mer-
chandise must stand on its own feet in the open market ... without the competitive advantage to be 
obtained by the use of prohibited exclusionary agreements."). 
107 See Brawn Shoe, Inc., 62 F.T.C. at 716 (finding it irrelevant that the arrangement only governed 
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claimed that, if exclusive dealing did produce any cognizable benefits, the 
parties would pursue such a course "voluntarily," that is, without any con-
tractual requirement of exclusivity. 108 Indeed, just a few years earlier the 
Commission held that evidence regarding such a restraint's benefits was 
simply inadmissible. 109 
Finally, the agencies took a similar approach when applying the ban 
on monopolization contained in Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In particular, 
both agencies took the position that any non-standard contract imposed by a 
monopolist that disadvantaged competitors presumptively "maintained" the 
firm's monopoly in violation of Section 2."0 As a result, such contracts 
were void absent "a very strong justification."'" 
The agencies displayed similar hostility toward complete vertical inte-
gration by merger. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, for instance, the 
Department challenged a merger between Brown and Kinney, on the 
grounds that the transaction would give Brown a two to three percent share 
of the unconcentrated national market in shoe retailing. 112 Here again, the 
government claimed that the transaction would place a "clog on competi-
tion," by excluding Brown's competitors from preferred channels of distri-
I% of the nation's shoe stores). 
108 See Brief for the Federal Trade Commission at 29-30, Brown Shoe, 384 U.S. 316 (No. 118); see 
also Milton Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YALE L.J. 75,87-88 nn. 74-76 (1961) [herein-
after Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments] (describing FTC's hostility toward exclusive dealing 
contracts during this period). Leading scholars agreed with the government's assessment that dealers 
would embrace beneficial exclusivity "voluntarily." See Derek C. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case And 
The Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under The Clayton Act, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 307-08; JOEL 
DIRLAM & ALFRED KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 181-
87 (1954). 
109 See In re Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 717, 74041 (1960) (declaring exclusive 
arrangements between manufacturer and door-to-door salesmen a violation of Section 3 of the Clayton 
Act regardless of pro-competitive benefits). 
110 See In re Koppers Co., 77 F.T.C. 1675, 1684 (1970) (holding that requirements contracts "are 
particularly suspect when used by a monopolist"); Brief for the United States at 72-81, United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (I966) (No. 73) (contending that five year contracts and retention of title 
to equipment were "arrangements and policies which, instead of encouraging competition on pure merit, 
further the dominance of a particular fmn. In this sense they are unnatural barriers; they unnecessarily 
exclude actual and potential competition; they restrict a free market.") (quoting United States v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 34445 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521); Brief 
for the United States at 87, 12648, United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) 
(No. 394), 87, 12648 (arguing that defendant's policies of leasing its machines instead of selling them, 
requiring machines to be used at full capacity, and tying service to machines were presumptively mo-
nopolistic). 
Ill Koppers Co., 77 F.T.C. at 1684. 
112 370 u.s. 294, 327-334 (I 962). 
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bution. 113 Not to be outdone, the FTC also challenged vertical mergers con-
ferring trivial shares of the distribution market on the merging parties. 114 
B. The Collapse of the Inhospitality Tradition 
The inhospitality tradition did not last forever, however. To begin 
with, rigorous applications of price theory called the agencies' more ex-
treme positions into question. Members of the Chicago School, for in-
stance, questioned how a firm with market power could profit by "extend-
ing" that power to an input market.115 Others pointed out the threat of mo-
nopolistic conduct was implausible in many of the markets in question, 
given the vast number of independent competitors. 116 Finally, some sug-
gested that the "market power" or barriers to entry identified by the gov-
ernment were in fact beneficial product differentiation. 117 
The realization that anti-competitive explanations for much challenged 
conduct were implausible begged the obvious question; what else might 
explain such agreements? After all, if firms expended real resources negoti-
ating, enforcing and defending such arrangements, the absence of a market 
power explanation left the negative inference that something more benign 
was afoot. 118 For some, it was enough that such arrangements rarely pro-
duced market power .119 Others, however, set out to provide affirmative 
113 Jd. at 327-334. See also United States v. Kennecot Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 104-105 
(S.D. N. Y. 1964), a.ffd, 381 U.S. 414 (1965) (finding that merger between copper producer and one of 
ten manufacturers of "paper insulated copper wire" lessened competition by foreclosing other manufac-
turers from selling copper to the purchased firm); id. at 100 (fmding that acquired firm accounted for 
less than two percent of the purchases). 
114 See, e.g., Jn re A.G. Spaulding & Bros., 56 F.T.C. 1125, 1168-69 (1960) (declaring vertical 
merger unlawful without regard to share of market actually foreclosed). 
1I5 See Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integration and The Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Eco-
nomic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 157 (1954); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the 
Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 281 (1956). 
I16 See, e.g., BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 45, at 211 ("With more than 800 shoe 
manufacturers operating in a national market, the industry [in Brown Shoe] was as close to pure compe-
tition as is possible outside a classroom model."). See also Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 
supra note 108, at 87-88 (arguing that exclusive dealing agreements should not be unlawful if compet-
ing manufacturers have ready access to distribution through other dealers). 
117 See, e.g., BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 45, at 312-14; Posner, The Chicago 
School, supra note 98, at 929-30 (debunking the notion that advertising and associated product differen-
tiation were "barriers to entry" or otherwise indicia of consumer harm). 
118 See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(Bork, J.) (absent market power, trade restraints are presumptively designed to create efficiency); BORK, 
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 45, at 206-208 (same); POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 85, 
at 100-101. 
119 See, e.g., BaRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 45, at 205-207 (contending that merg-
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explanations for such arrangements. The result of this later search has been 
what is now known as "transaction cost economics" ("TCE").120 According 
to TCE, so-called nonstandard contracts, including complete integration 
and other exclusionary rights agreements, were presumptively efforts to 
avoid the (transaction) costs of the alternative, namely, spot market con-
tracting.121 So, for instance, tying contracts could protect the goodwill of 
sellers from opportunistic purchasing decisions by buyers. 122 Other schol-
ars articulated a different transaction cost account of tying contracts, claim-
ing that such arrangements could facilitate price discrimination by a finn 
with market power over the tying product. 123 Complete vertical integration 
could grant a manufacturer additional control over its distribution and thus 
overcome the transaction costs produced by reliance on the market. 124 
Moreover, exclusive dealing contracts between a manufacturer and its deal-
ers could ensure that dealers devoted their energies toward promoting the 
manufacturer's product, thus ensuring that other manufacturers could not 
"free ride" on a manufacturer's promotional efforts. 125 Finally, a buyer's 
agreement to purchase only from a particular supplier could ensure the lat-
ers in unconcentrated markets likely produce efficiencies); see also Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 221. 
120 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 15-42 (describing origins and 
research agenda ofTCE); id. at 16-17 (describing TCE as a response to price theory). 
121 See, e.g., id. at 28 ("The transaction cost literature also maintains the rebuttable presumption 
that nonstandard forms of contracting have efficiency purposes."). See generally, OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATION {1975); R. H. 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical integra-
tion of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AMER. ECON. REv. 112 (1971). 
122 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 85, at 175-76. Subsequent scholars offered a similar 
"market failure" theory justifYing tying contracts imposed by franchisors on franchisees. See Benjamin 
Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J. L. & ECON. 345, 
351-54 (1985) [hereinafter Klein & Saft, Franchise Tying Contracts]. 
123 See BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 45, at 376-78; Director & Levi, supra note 
115, at 290-92. 
124 See Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953,958-
59 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions] (recognizing that complete 
vertical integration could overcome market failure); see also Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufactur-
ers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86 (1962). While Telser advanced this rationale for a manufac-
turer's efforts to control the price of independent dealers, the argument applies with equal force to 
complete vertical integration. Indeed, some scholars hostile to Telser's analysis of minimum rpm have 
argued that such complete integration was a less restrictive and therefore preferable alternative. See, 
e.g., Peter C. Carstensen, The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: The Efficiency Hy-
pothesis Versus the Rent-Seeking, Strategic Alternatives, 69 ANTITRUST L. J. 569,606-608 (2001); id. at 
608 ("The most plausible response [to dealer free riding] will remain that of internalizing the activity 
within the organization in such a way that free riding is made unfeasible by the very nature of the busi-
ness organization."); Robert Pitofsky, Why Dr. Miles Was Right, 8 Reg. 27,29 (1984). 
125 See Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J. L. & ECON. I, 6-11 (1982) [hereinafter Marvel, 
Exclusive Dealing]. 
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ter an outlet for its goods and thus encourage relationship-specific invest-
ments.126 Similar logic could explain nonstandard agreements that did not 
involve the purchase of exclusionary rights, as in the case of minimum or 
maximum resale price maintenance. 127 Contracts that produce such benefits, 
it should be noted, often result in prices that are higher than those that 
would obtain in markets characterized by unbridled rivalry and resulting 
market failure. 128 
Transaction cost economics did not purport to explain all nonstandard 
agreements. Instead, TCE is exemplifying theory, and thus merely identi-
fies the conditions under which pro-competitive explanations are plausi-
ble.129 Moreover, identification of such conditions does not, as a matter of 
logic, exclude the possibility of alternative explanations.130 Indeed, even 
proof that an agreement actually produces significant benefits does not it-
self ensure that no harm results. For instance, the mere fact that an exclu-
sive dealing arrangement assures a manufacturer of a return on its promo-
tional investment does not preclude the possibility that the agreement si-
multaneously confers market power on the parties to it. 
Still, the collapse of the inhospitality tradition gave rise to a rather 
large question: when, exactly, could an exclusionary rights agreement pro-
duce consumer harm? Given the internal and external critiques outlined 
above, it was no longer sufficient to invoke metaphors like "foreclosure" or 
126 See Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body 
General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 199, 201 (1988) (explaining that require-
ment that General Motors purchase only from Fisher Body protected the later from opportunism and 
thus induced relationship-specific investment); see also Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, & Armen 
A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. 
& ECON. 297 (1978); Milton Handler, Statement Before the Small Business Administration, 11 
ANTITRUST BULL. 417, 424-25 ( 1966) (suggesting that "an exclusive buying provision can constitute a 
vital quid pro quo to avoid placing the seller at the dealer's mercy"). 
127 See Tclser, supra note 124, at 86, 90-96 (arguing that minimum resale price maintenance can 
induce dealers to engage in non-price promotion and thus overcome failure in unbridled market for 
distribution services). See also Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division, supra note 28 (applying Tel-
ser's analysis to exclusive territories); Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 
886 (1981); Lee E. Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public 
Policy Standards, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 506, 511-512 & n.I2 (outlining various benefits of 
intrabrand restraints, including the encouragement of promotional activity; id. at 512 (explaining why 
firms may forego complete vertical integration and instead rely upon independent dealers to distribute 
their goods). 
128 See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18, at 145-161. 
129 See Franklin M. Fischer, Games Economists Play: A Non-Cooperative View, 20 RAND J. ECON. 
113, 117-18 (1989) ("Exemplifying theory does not tell us what must happen. Rather, it tells us what 
can happen.") (emphasis in the original). 
130 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L. J. 271, 272-281 (1987); Wil-
liamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions, supra note 124, at 953, 960-68 (discussing possible 
"strategic effects" from certain nonstandard contracts). 
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"clog on competition."131 For, economists and others had shown that such 
exclusivity was often absolutely necessary to achieve beneficial results. 132 
According to some, particularly those in the Chicago School, the answer to 
this question seemed to be "never," or at least "almost never."133 Others 
resisted this conclusion, but without offering any plausible or falsifiable 
account of when, exactly, such restraints or transactions produced harms. 134 
Raising Rivals Costs ("RRC") filled this void, by offering a theoreti-
cally plausible, unified account of how, exactly, various exclusionary rights 
contracts can confer market power on their proponents. 135 RRC essentially 
sidestepped the broad Chicago critique. Whereas Chicagoans had argued 
that such arrangements could not enhance preexisting market power, RRC 
suggested that firms without preexisting market power might use such 
agreements to create such power in the first place.136 In particular, RRC 
131 See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324 (invoking "clog on competition" metaphor); id. at 328-34 
(invoking foreclosure concern); Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 314 (iovoking "clog on competition" meta-
phor and market foreclosure). 
132 For instance, a manufacturer that advertised heavily to ultimate consumers might find that such 
advertising induced consumers to visit dealers who cajoled consumers into purchasing competing prod-
ucts. Because so-called best efforts clauses and other devices would not halt this behavior, a manufac-
turer would have no choice but to adopt an exclusive dealer's provision. See generally Marvel, Exclu-
sive Dealing, supra note 125. 
133 See BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 45, at 140-42 (rejecting notion of anti-
competitive leverage as resting upon the fallacy of"double counting"); id. at 213-14 (rejecting Court's 
invocation of this theory in Brown Shoe for the same reasons); id. at 309 ("The truth appears to be that 
there has never been a case in which exclusive dealiog or requirements contracts were shown to iojure 
competition."). 
134 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 448-54 (1977) (endorsing per se rule against 
ties obtained by firms with market power). 
I35 See generally, Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising 
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L. J. 209 (1986) [hereinafter Krattenmaker & 
Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs]; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Wage Rates as Barriers to Entry: The 
Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 Q. J. ECON. 85 (1968) (explaining how coal companies used regula-
tory process to impose costs on rivals, thereby conferring market power on themselves). 
136 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 251 ("[A] fmn need not 
enjoy or acquire traditional market power to gain the ability to price above pre-exclusionary-rights 
competitive levels."); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Analyzing Anticompetitive 
Exclusion, 56 ANTITRUST L. J. 71, 79 (1987) ("Where firms raise competitors' costs and thereby gain 
power over price, they have achieved market power. Market power is the ability to raise or maintain 
price above the competitive level."); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande & Steven C. Salop, 
Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L. J. 241, 249 (1987) [hereinafter Krat-
tenmaker & Lande, Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law] (distinguishing between 
preexisting "Stiglerian" power and so-called "Bainian" power created by restraints that raise rivals' 
costs); Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying 
Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REv. Ill, 145-48 (1996) [hereinafter Meese, Franchise Tying Contracts] (ex-
plaining how a franchisor can employ a tying contract to raise rivals' costs without regard to preexisting 
market power). 
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concluded that a firm could employ exclusionary rights contracts to deprive 
its competitors of access to low cost inputs, thereby allowing the predator 
to price above its own costs to the detriment of consumers. 137 ·So, for in-
stance, a manufacturer that entered exclusive dealing contracts with the 
market's low cost dealers could raise its rivals' costs of distribution and 
thus price its own output above cost. 138 Similarly, a firm could employ ty-
ing contracts to prevent its customers from purchasing inputs from other 
suppliers, thereby depriving those firms of efficient scale or driving one or 
more out of business. 139 The result may be a market that is so concentrated 
as to facilitate actual or tacit collusion between the remaining firms, thus 
raising the costs that rivals must pay for inputs.14° Finally, a firm can inte-
grate backwards by merger, thus removing independent suppliers from the 
marketplace and allowing the remaining suppliers to collude and increase 
rivals' costs. 141 
None of these strategies, it should be emphasized, depends upon the 
predator's possession of pre-existing market power. 142 To be sure, firms 
may pay a premium to purchase the exclusionary right at issue. A manufac-
turer, for instance, may provide dealers who agree to exclusivity a "bonus" 
in the form of a discount off the market price of the product to be sold. 143 
137 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 227-47. 
138 See id. at 234-36; id. at 226 (explaining how distribution can qualify as an input); see also 
Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and 
Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617,626-28 (1999) [hereinafter Salop & Romaine, Economic Analy-
sis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft) (explaining how so-called "customer foreclosure" and "input 
foreclosure" can raise rivals' costs). 
139 See Meese, Franchise Tying Contracts, supra note 136, at 145-147; see also Krattenmaker & 
Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 240-42 (explaining how exclusionary rights agreements 
can reduce number of independent suppliers in the market place, thus facilitating collusion among 
remaining finns ). 
140 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 240-42 (describing so-
called "Frankenstein monster" theory, whereby agreement changes industry structure in a way that 
facilitates collusion between remaining suppliers and raises rivals' costs); id. at 245-48 (explaining how 
a franchisor can employ tying contracts to deprive its competitors of efficient input suppliers); see also 
Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. DIC Concrete Corp., 467 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (scrutinizing 
joint venture between concrete supplier and subcontractor that left competing contractor at the mercy of 
single concrete source). 
141 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 240-42; see also Michael 
H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST 
L. J. 513,519-22 (1995). 
142 See Krattenrnaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 25 I; see also Kratten-
maker & Lande, Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, supra note 136, at 254-55 (reli-
ance on market share thresholds to detect raising rivals' cost scheme is "seriously flawed"). 
143 See Salop & Romaine, Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, supra note 138, at 
617, 627-28 (explaining that finns can obtain exclusivity rights by using "carrots," i.e., payments to 
right holders); cf Brown Shoe, 62 F.T.C. at 679, 687-90 (describing how Brown Shoe offered various 
advantages to induce dealers to enter primary dealing contracts). As explained in the text, the mere 
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Still, such a payment scheme does not require or even suggest the posses-
sion or exercise of pre-existing market power. After all, firms regularly 
employ such differential pricing to induce partners to accept contractual 
terms or other practices they might not otherwise embrace. 144 Far from re-
flecting an exercise of market power, such differentials instead reflect the 
distinct costs that different arrangements entail. 145 By charging different 
prices for different contracts, then, manufacturers or other sellers cause 
purchasers to internalize the costs associated with different contractual 
terms. 146 In the same way, differential pricing that induces an input owner 
to grant an exclusionary right need not involve an exercise of market 
power. Instead, such a premium may simply reflect the purchaser's hope or 
expectation that it will obtain such power in the future. Given this expecta-
tion, a seller's failure to grant an exclusionary right imposes an opportunity 
cost on the putative purchaser of the right, a cost reflected in the pur-
chaser's willingness to offer more generous terms in return for exclusiv-
ity .147 By offering and adhering to such terms, the predator essentially 
shares the (expected) fruits of its market power with the owner of the input 
in question.148 Indeed, while some characterize exclusionary rights agree-
ments as involving the "use" of power to obtain or protect such power, 
existence of such payments does not itself indicate that something anti-competitive is afoot. Parties 
often use such inducements to convince trading partners to enter beneficial arrangements. 
144 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 32-34 (explaining how a firm 
can use differential pricing to induce its trading partner to agree to contractual provisions that reduce the 
prospect of opportunism); see also Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics: 
Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REv. I, 69-70 (1997) [hereinafter Meese, Tying 
Meets The New Institutional Economics] (explaining how a firm without market power can induce 
purchasers to accept a tying contract through differential pricing). 
145 See Meese, Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics, supra note 144, at 69-70 (cost-based 
differential does not reflect exercise of market power). 
146 Jd; see also Meese, Franchise Tying Contracts, supra note 136, at 139-40 (explaining how the 
law's assignment of trademark rights to franchisor allows for such differential pricing). 
147 This analysis, it should be noted, explains the result in decisions such as Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. 
May Dept. Stores Co., in which a frustrated bidder for a scarce asset can establish antitrust injury. 881 
F. Supp. 860, 878 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). In these cases, any premium that the prevailing bidder is willing to 
pay may well flow from the unlawful exercise of market power that results. Thus, it cannot be said with 
any degree of certainty that a lawful acquisition would have produced the same injury. Cf Alberta Gas 
Chems., Ltd. v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that 
plaintiff did not suffer antitrust injury where a perfectly lawful transaction would have produced the 
same harm). 
148 See All. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965) (evaluating arrangement whereby Goodyear paid 
refiner commissions in return for latter's efforts to induce outlets to carry former's products); see also 
Meese, Franchise Tying Contracts, supra note 136, at 146 (explaining that a franchisor that pursued 
raising rivals' costs scheme could induce participation by franchisees by sharing expected profits with 
them). 
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close analysis suggests that this characterization is beside the point and 
downright misleading. 149 
Just as TCE did not purport to explain all non-standard agreements, 
RRC did not suggest that all exclusionary rights agreements are anti-
competitive. Far from it. While price theory treated all non-standard agree-
ments, including exclusionary rights agreements, as presumptively mo-
nopolistic, the RRC paradigm singled out only a small subset of such 
agreements for condemnation. 150 Indeed, even the proponents of this para-
digm have conceded that the conditions necessary for such an arrangement 
to confer market power are relatively rare. 151 These conditions include: 
concentrated input markets, barriers that preclude entry into such markets, 
agreements that foreclose rivals from a sufficient portion of the input mar-
ket, inputs that constitute a significant portion of the cost of rivals' prod-
ucts, the absence of meaningful competition from rivals that do not use 
such inputs, and the inability of rivals to employ a "predatory counterstrat-
egy" that thwarts an otherwise successful RRC strategy.152 By contrast, 
exclusionary rights agreements are ubiquitous, and they arise in a number 
of contexts in which one or more of these necessary conditions is not pre-
sent. At the same time, other scholars have argued that supposedly para-
digmatic examples of conduct that raised rivals' costs were in fact pro-
competitive or benign. 153 Moreover, just as a plausible transaction cost 
149 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding, with one 
exception, that "OEM license restrictions at issue represent uses of Microsoft's market power to protect 
its monopoly, unredeemed by any legitimate justification") (emphasis added); John J. Flynn, Standard 
Oil and Microsoft-Intriguing Parallels or Limping Analogies?, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 645, 712 (2001) 
(contending that various exclusionary practices "involved the use of Microsoft's monopoly power to 
erect substantial barriers to competition that could have eroded its monopoly power in the operating 
system market"); see a/sa Meese, Franchise Tying Contracts. supra note 136, at 146 ("There is, of 
course, no logical connection between proof [that a firm has preexisting market power] and the likeli-
hood that a tying contract implements a 'raising rivals' costs' strategy."). As explained below, the 
United States embraced similar metaphors to support its case against Microsoft. See infra notes 172-83 
and accompanying text 
ISO See supra notes 96-114 and accompanying text (explaining price theory's presumption against 
such agreements). 
151 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 267 ("Certainly, in most 
industries, exclusionary rights contracts cannot be profitably employed for anti-competitive ends."); id. 
at 214 (stating that firms can employ exclusionary rights contracts to obtain or protect market power in 
"carefully defined circumstances"); id. at 223 ("We present an antitrust theory that explains how a wide 
variety of exclusionary restraints can, under fairly strict conditions, create or enhance market power.") 
(emphasis added). 
152 See Krattenmaker and Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 253-67 (discussing 
numerous necessary conditions for successful raising rivals' costs strategies). 
153 See Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ~"'TITRUST L. J. 693, 712-
15 (2000) [hereinafter Muris, FTC and the Law of Monopolization] (discussing the conclusion of these 
scholars). 
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story does not exclude the possibility that an arrangement harms consum-
ers, so too a plausible RRC story leaves open the possibility that an agree-
ment "on balance" enhances welfare. 154 In other words, an exclusionary 
rights contract can both create market power and produce significant bene-
fits. Iss 
III. FROM THEORY TO ENFORCEMENT: A BUMPY ROAD 
Taken together, RRC and TCE provide extremely useful theoretical 
tools (paradigms?) for interpreting exclusionary rights contracts. If inte-
grated and applied properly, these two paradigms could certainly improve 
the quality of enforcement decision-making and thus the quality of antitrust 
regulation in general. Nonetheless, as shown below, the agencies have 
failed to implement fully the lessons ofRRC and TCE. 
!54 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals· Costs, supra note 135, at 277-78 (recognizing that 
exclusionary rights agreements, like other forms of complete and partial vertical integration, may be 
methods of reducing the transaction costs of relying upon markets to conduct economic activity); see 
also Salop and Romaine, Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, supra note 138, at 642-
43 ("Proof that exclusionary conduct is likely to lead to consumer welfare harm, is only part of a com-
plete economic analysis. One must also examine the possibility that the conduct leads to efficiency 
benefits."). It should be noted that Krattenmaker and Salop seem to understate somewhat the prevalence 
of efficient exclusionary rights contracts. In particular, they assert that firms have incentives to obtain 
market power and reduce costs and that "a priori, one cannot presume which of these incentives will 
explain a randomly selected exclusionary rights agreement." See Krattenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' 
Costs, supra note 135, at 277. This statement reflects an undue degree of epistemological pessimism. As 
noted at the outset of this paper, exclusionary rights contracts are ubiquitous and common sense sug-
gests that most such arrangements beneficial. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. Indeed, even 
Krattenmaker and Salop admit that most industries are not amenable to exclusionary rights agreements 
that create market power. See Kattenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 267. 
Moreover, even those industries in which anti-competitive exclusionary rights arrangements are possi-
ble no doubt support any number of entirely benign exclusionary rights agreements. Thus, it seems, one 
may properly presume that a "randomly selected" exclusionary rights agreement is beneficial. See 
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 28 (TCE creates rebuttable presumption that 
nonstandard contracts are cost-reducing devices). Any attempt to construct a Rule of Reason test that 
incorporates the RRC and TCE paradigms should begin with the presumption that Williamson has 
identified. 
155 Krattenmaker and Salop reported that they were not aware of a case in which the Supreme 
Court determined that anti-competitive effects in fact coexisted with procompetitive benefits. See Krat-
tenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 278. From this observation they conclude 
that such cases of coexisting costs and benefits are rare in the real world. Jd. However, insofar as courts 
and the enforcement agencies had not been applying the RRC and TCE paradigms at the time, Kratten-
maker and Salop's observation has little force. We would not expect courts or enforcement agencies to 
find something they were not seeking. See generally KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 30, 
at 114-117 (explaining that changed scientific paradigms cause individuals to understand old data in 
new ways). 
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A. The Agencies and Theory: A Mixed Bag 
Certainly the agencies have modified their enforcement positions in 
response to recent developments in economic theory. For one thing, the 
agencies have adopted enforcement guidelines for vertical mergers that 
reflect a rejection of the more extreme manifestations of price theory's in-
hospitality tradition.156 Moreover, the agencies have abandoned earlier po-
sitions that were extremely hostile to exclusive dealing contracts.157 In to-
day's enforcement environment, a firm in an unconcentrated market can 
pursue an exclusive dealing contract or vertical merger without fear of fed-
eral intervention. 158 
At the same time, the agencies have shown a willingness to rely, if 
only implicitly, upon raising rivals' costs reasoning when making or justi-
fying enforcement actions. 159 Still, while the agencies have implicitly relied 
on RRC in some contexts, they have been extremely reluctant to internalize 
the lessons ofTCE. Even after TCE offered benign explanations for various 
non-standard agreements, the agencies maintained and even accelerated 
their hostility to such agreements. For instance, in 1968, more than five 
years after Lester Telser's famous article explaining how resale price main-
tenance could lower the cost of distribution, the Department of Justice told 
the Supreme Court that exclusive territories, for instance, could produce no 
156 See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at§ 4.2 (requiring proof of significant concen-
tration as predicate for challenge to vertical merger). 
157 See In re Bellone Elecs., Inc., 100 F.T.C. 68, 197-204 (1982) (abandoning earlier Commission 
decisions hostile to exclusive dealing contracts). 
158 Cf supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text (explaining how enforcement agencies often 
pursued such transactions during the inhospitality era). 
159 In Microsoft, for instance, the government told a story in which the firm employed a variety of 
tactics to raise Netscape's costs of distribution and thereby prevent that company's "Navigator" browser 
from retaining its preeminent position on PC desktops by raising Netscape's costs of distribution. In this 
way, it is said, Microsoft deprived the public of a pool of Netscape-compatible applications and thus 
raised the minimum viable scale of potential entrants into the operating system market. See Alan J. 
Meese, Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), 9 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 761, 773-75 (2001) [hereinafter 
Meese, Don't Disintegrate Microsoft]; Alan J. Meese, Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many 
Products Does Microsoft Sell, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 65, I 08-11 ( 1999) [hereinafter Meese, Monopoly 
Bundling] (explaining how bundling of Windows and Internet Explorer could be part of a scheme to 
raise Netscape's costs); Salop & Romaine, Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, supra 
note 138, at 636-39; see also FTC v. Intel Corp., 1999 FTC Lexis 145 (August 3, 1999) (reporting entry 
of consent order). The Commission relied upon raising rivals' costs reasoning when explaining the 
rationale for its complaint against Intel. See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Com-
ment, 2 (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/osl!999/9903/d09288intelanalysis.htm; see also In re 
B. F. Goodrich Co., 110 F.T.C. 207 (1988) (rejecting proposed enforcement action against vertical 
merger because conditions outlined by raising rivals' costs paradigm were not met). It should be noted 
that the B.F. Goodrich decision is the only opinion of the Federal Trade Commission that cites Profes-
sors Krattenmaker's and Salop's seminal article. 
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cognizable benefits. 16° Five years later, the Department informed the Court 
that exclusive territories ancillary to an otherwise legitimate joint venture 
were equally suspect and, in fact, inferior to government control over en-
try. 161 In so doing, the Department ignored cogent analysis to the contrary 
authored by Robert Bork and cited in the opposing brief. 162 Indeed, when 
the Supreme Court reconsidered the legality of exclusive territories in Con-
tinental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, the best the agencies could do was "sit this 
one out," declining, as they did, to file an amicus brief. 163 Ironically, Don-
ald Turner, who had led the charge against such restraints during the 1960s, 
filed an amicus brief urging the Court to undo his handiwork! 164 Finally, in 
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, the United States filed an 
amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to retain the per se rule against an-
cillary horizontal maximum price fixing, despite significant scholarly com-
mentary showing that Rule of Reason treatment was more appropriate for 
such agreements. 165 
Indeed, even today, decades after the TCE revolution began, the agen-
cies continue to resist TCE in a number of ways. For instance, the agencies 
continue to enforce the per se rules against minimum resale price mainte-
nance and horizontal maximum price fixing, neither of which makes eco-
160 See Brieffor the United States at 27-28, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 
(1967) (No. 25). See also Telser, supra note 124, at passim. It should be noted that Robert Bork ex-
tended Telser's analysis to exclusive territories in 1965. See Bork, Price Fixing And Market Division, 
supra note 28, at 429-52; see also Robert L. Jordan, Exclusive Territories and Restricted Sales Areas 
Under The Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA L. REv. Ill (1962). Moreover, even before Bork had extended 
Telser' s analysis, private parties and lower courts were explaining how exclusive territories and a reser-
vation of customers could reduce a manufacturer's cost of distribution. See Sandum Co. v. FTC, 339 
F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Brief for White Motor Co. at 42-43, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 
U.S. 253 (1963) (No. 54). One co-author of the government's brief in Schwinn has claimed that it re-
flected the best analysis that economic science had to offer at the time. See RICHARD A POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 3 (2d ed. 1977). However, Oliver Williamson, who was serving as 
an economist at the Department of Justice at the time, reports that he expressly objected to the brief, 
apparently on the grounds that it disregarded Telser's analysis. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 185 n.22. 
161 See Brief for the United States at 26, United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (No. 
72-82). 
162 See Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division, supra note 28, at 429-52. 
163 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
164 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n at 16-23, Continental T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (No. 76-15) (explaining how vertical restrictions can overcome 
market failures, including the free rider problem); id. at 34-47 (arguing that the Court should overrule 
Schwinn). 
165 See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 7-10, Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 
332 (1982) (No. 80-419) (claiming that "compelling economic arguments support the per se ban on 
horizontal maximum price fixing"). 
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nomic sense in light of the teaching ofTCE. 166 Moreover, while both agen-
cies advised the Supreme Court to abandon the per se rule against maxi-
mum resale price maintenance, they also urged the Court to reject a rule of 
per se legality, even though neither could offer a scenario in which such 
contracts could, by themselves, reduce consumer welfare. 167 
Despite their occasional invocation of RRC and the advent of TCE, 
the enforcement agencies continue to embrace doctrines unduly hostile to 
exclusionary rights agreements. For instance, the agencies still embrace the 
per se rule against tying contracts, asserting that such agreements should be 
unlawful per se whenever a seller has economic power in the market for the 
tying product. 168 This rule is vastly overinclusive, banning, as it does, cer-
tain tying contracts without regard to their propensity to raise rivals' costs 
or to otherwise inflict harm on consumers. 169 After all, the mere fact that a 
seller has preexisting market power does not suggest that an arrangement 
raises the costs of any input purchased by the firm's competitors; the 
agreement may instead govern only a tiny fraction of the input market in 
question. 170 Thus, it seems, adherence to this rule is a throwback to price 
theory and the inhospitality tradition. 171 Indeed, in the Microsoft case, the 
Department of Justice embraced a price-theoretic account of such agree-
166 See DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
POLICY fN HEALTH CARE§ 881 (1996), reprinted in 71 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1777 
(1996), available at http:f/www.ftc.govfreportslhlth3s.htm. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Maxi-
mum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 886 (1981); Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Mainte-
nance Controversy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L. J. 59 (1994) (explaining how 
advances in economic theory establish presumption that minimum resale price maintenance is pro-
competitive). 
167 See Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal Trade Commission at 17-24, State Oil 
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (No. 96-871). 
168 See Brief for Appellees United States and the State Plaintiffs at 99-102, United States v. Micro-
soft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213) (invoking and applying the per se 
rule); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (refusing to jettison per se 
rule against ties obtained by firms with market power). It should be noted that, during the Reagan Ad-
ministration, the Department of Justice attempted to convince the court to abandon the per se rule in 
favor of a rule of reason analysis. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, Jefferson Parish Hosp. 
Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (no. 82-1031). The government did not, however, rely heavily 
upon transaction cost reasoning in its brief, choosing instead to focus on the claim that such contracts 
are rarely anti-competitive. See Meese, Tying Meets The New Institutional Economies, supra note 144, 
at 48-49 (explaining government position expressed in this brief). 
169 See Meese, Monopoly Bundling, supra note 159, at 80-91. 
170 In Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, for instance, the Court evaluated a tying arrangement that 
required purchasers of defendant's canning equipment to purchase defendant's salt as well. See 332 U.S. 
392 (1947). Obviously the arrangement left open numerous efficient channels of distribution for com-
peting manufacturers of salt. 
171 See Meese, Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics. supra note 144, at 71-86 (describing 
price-theoretic premises of per se rule against tying contracts). 
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ments with a vengeance, claiming, for instance, that "if the bundling of 
Windows and Internet Explorer were efficient, the combined product 
should thrive in a competitive market."172 As the government saw things, a 
"competitive" market was one free of tying contracts. 173 In so arguing, the 
government begged the question before the court, namely, whether such 
contracts further the process of competition, or, instead, hamper it. 174 Ac-
cording to the government, such agreements and conduct were presump-
tively unlawful, without regard to whether they produced any tangible eco-
nomic harm. 175 In outlining this position, the government ignored a large 
172 See Memorandum ofthe United States in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 10, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232) (emphasis 
added); see also Plaintiffs' Joint Response to Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in 
Support of Motions for Preliminary Injunction at 66, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 
30 (D.D.C. 2000) (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233) ("[I]t is for the market, not the self-serving assertions of the 
defendant, to determine whether [a bundle] is good or bad."). At the same time, the United States also 
endorsed and relied upon the so-called "separate demand" test for determining whether a bundle of two 
separate items in fact constitute two products that can be illegally "tied" together. See Plaintiffs' Joint 
Response. supra, at 50-67; see also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-23 (articulating this test). This test 
declares two items to be separate products whenever some market participants unbundle the items. The 
presence of such unbundling, it is said, establishes that it is "efficient" for the defendant to offer both 
items separately. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-23; 10 PHILLIP AREEDA, EINER ELHAUGE, AND 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW .,.nJ 1741, 1744, and 1745b, c (2d ed. 2004). As I have shown 
elsewhere, the separate demand test rests upon outmoded price-theoretic assumptions, namely, that all 
market participants possess the same production function and thus face the same costs and benefits of 
bundling. See Meese, Monopoly Bundling, supra note 159, at 86-87. Relaxation of this assumption 
undermines any claim that a "separate demand" establishes the efficiency of unbundling. See id. at 86-
90. 
173 See Memorandum of the United States in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 10, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232) ("Micro-
soft has chosen to avoid the test of competition ... [by] depriv[ing] its customers of the competitive 
[unbundled] option."). 
174 See John F. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, 
GEO. WASH. U. L. REv., 367,401-04 (2001) (describing various benefits of bundling Internet Explorer 
with the Windows operating system); Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18 (explaining that various 
restrictions on rivalry are often necessary to produce economic results that would be produced by a 
perfect market); Easterbrook, Ratchet in Antitrust, supra note 44, at 715 (1982) (explaining that inhospi-
tality tradition emphasized competition in the spot market); cf Ronald H. Coase, Industrial Organiza-
tion: A Proposal for Research, in POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 67-68 (Victor R. Fuchs, ed., 1972) (explaining that nonstandard contracts are often a 
"necessary element in bringing about a competitive situation"); Hayek, The Meaning of Competition, 
supra note 6, at 92-99 (contending that price theorists improperly equated competition with a particular 
"state of affairs" without recognizing that various "anti-competitive" practices were necessary to bring 
about such a result). 
175 See Memorandum of the United States in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 10, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232). 
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body of literature explaining why reliance on its version of a "competitive" 
market can result in a market failure that tying contracts can attenuate. 176 
The government's approach to its monopolization case reflected simi-
lar reliance on price theoretic concepts. The government drew a distinction 
between "competition on the merits," on the one hand, and "exclusionary" 
conduct, on the other. 177 Competition on the merits took the form of inter-
nal activities, such as efforts to reduce production costs and improve prod-
uct quality. 178 Such conduct was, the government said, lawful per se, even 
if it maintained a monopoly. 179 By contrast, exclusionary conduct took the 
form of exclusionary rights contracts like tying and exclusive dealing 
agreements. In so doing, the government embraced the outmoded and mis-
leading rhetoric of price theory, claiming that such agreements were meth-
ods of "wielding" monopolistic leverage to "foreclose competition on the 
merits."1g0 Thus, the government did not mention any requirement that it 
176 See Meese, Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics, supra note 144, at 50-66; Klein & 
Saft, Franchise Tying Contracts. supra note 122, at passim (explaining how franchise tying contracts 
can outcome market failure produced by reliance on franchisees' unrestricted judgment); see also supra 
notes 122-23 and accompanying text (collecting additional sources). 
177 See Brief For Appellees United States and the State Plaintiffs at 47-51, United States v. Micro-
soft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 98-1232); Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 2, 
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 98-1232) ("Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
prohibits a firm with monopoly power from maintaining that monopoly power through means that go 
beyond competition on the merits."); see also id. at 15 ("The Court has used the language of 'exclusion-
ary' or 'anti-competitive' or 'predatory' to label the unlawful conduct and to distinguish it from the 
competition on the merits reflected in Grinnell's reference to 'superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident."') (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966)). 
178 See Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 15, United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 
34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 98-1232) (referring to competition on the merits as involving "superior prod-
uct, business acumen, or historic accident") (quoting Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571); id. at 17 (contending 
that apparently exclusionary conduct can only be justified "as necessary to further legitimate goals of 
lowering prices, improving quality, or in other ways promoting or expanding consumer choice."); id. at 
19 (any act that limits consumer choice is "telling evidence" that the defendant is not engaged in "com-
petition on the merits"). 
179 See Plaintiffs' Joint Conclusions of Law at 15, United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (No. 98-1232). 
180 See Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 22-
23, United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 98-1232) ; id. at 22 ("By using mo-
nopoly power to compel a customer to purchase a product it might prefer to purchase elsewhere, a 
monopolist 'forecloses competition on the merits in a product market distinct from the market for the 
tying item.'") (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 22 (1984)); id. ("Micro-
soft's use of its monopoly power in Windows 98 to coerce OEMs to license Internet Explorer implicates 
precisely this core Section 2 concern."); see also Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law, at 18-
19, United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 98-1232) (contending that "exclusive, 
preferential, restrictive, or otherwise exclusionary contracts, especially when coercively imposed by use 
of monopoly power, can constitute the requisite anti-competitive acts."); id at 49 (decrying "Micro-
soft's readiness to use monopoly power to blunt threats by means that reduce rather than expand con-
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prove the various elements associated these with the RRC paradigm to es-
tablish a prima facie case. 181 The government's invocation of price-
theoretic metaphors revealed a lack of appreciation of the manner in which 
such contracts can harm competition. 182 Instead, according to the govern-
ment, proof that a monopolist had entered an agreement that ''tends to im-
pair the opportunities of a monopolist's rivals" by itself established a prima 
facie case for liability. 183 The preference for "competition on the merits" 
and bias against non-standard contracts exceeded the scope of regulation 
implied by the RRC paradigm while at the same time ignoring the teach-
ings of TCE to the effect that such agreements are generally efficient, even 
when entered by a monopolist. 184 Given the RRC and TCE paradigms, 
proof that a monopolist has entered an exclusionary rights contract cannot, 
by itself, give rise to a presumption against the agreement. 185 The Federal 
Trade Commission took a similar approach to monopolization doctrine 
during the same period. 186 
sumer choice on the merits."). 
181 Cf Plaintiffs' Joint Conclusions of Law at 16, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 98-1232) (plaintiff need not show that conduct actually harmed rivals, only that it 
might "tend" to do so); Brief for Appellees at 74, United States and State Plaintiffs, United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 98-1232) (government need not show that Micro-
soft excluded competitors from cheapest method of distribution); cf supra notes 150-153 and accompa-
nying text (articulating various necessary conditions for the success of a Raising Rivals' Costs strategy). 
182 See supra notes 142-149 and accompanying text (explaining that RRC strategies do not involve 
"exercise" of preexisting market power). 
183 See Brief for Appellees United States and the State Plaintiffs at 47, United States v. Microsoft, 
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 98-1232); Plaintiffs' Joint Conclusions of Law at 16, United States v. 
Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 98-1232) (arguing that conduct by a monopolist that 
"tends to impair rivals' opportunities" must be justified.); id. at 20 (stating that conduct can be deemed 
exclusionary regardless of the degree of harm to rivals who are purportedly excluded.); see also Memo-
randum of the United States in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 22-23, United States v. 
Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 98-1232) (tying contract imposed by monopolist is pre-
sumptively exclusionary); id. at 39-40 (contending that primary dealing agreements between Microsoft 
and Internet Access Providers were prima facie exclusionary because they "foreclosed" competitors 
from "important" channels of distribution). 
184 See supra notes 111-155 and accompanying text; see also Meese, Don't Disintegrate Microsoft, 
supra note 159, at 786-87 (explaining how government's approach to defming a prima facie case rested 
upon outmoded price-theoretic reasoning). 
185 Cf Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18, at 145-61 (arguing that proof that a restraint that may 
overcome market failure results in higher prices cannot ipso facto give rise to a presumption against it); 
see also Muris, FTC and the Law of Monopolization, supra note 153, at 704-710. 
186 See Timothy J. Muris, FTC and the Law of Monopolization, supra note 153 (criticizing the 
Federal Trade Commission's overbroad definition of exclusionary conduct during this period); see also 
John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law and Economics 
of Exclusion, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 157, 227 (discussing the government's view that Microsoft's 
exclusive dealing agreements "would be unproblematic if they involved firms in competitive markets .. 
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The government's embrace of price theory was also evident in its ac-
count of how a monopolist could justify prima facie unlawful arrange-
ments. According to the government, a monopolist that had adopted such 
contracts could only avoid liability if it proved that: ( 1) the restraint pro-
duced significant economic benefits and (2) the restraint is not broader than 
necessary to achieve the benefits in question. 187 This test, of course, was 
simply a specific application of the more general Rule of Reason frame-
work that has evolved under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 188 
Like the Rule of Reason's method of evaluating asserted benefits, the 
approach adduced by the government was unduly biased against exclusion-
ary rights agreements. 189 Most importantly, the less restrictive alternative 
component is outmoded in light of transaction cost economics. After all, 
such a test rests on the assumption that any benefits produced by a contract 
or other practice necessarily coexist with the anti-competitive effects pre-
sumed once a plaintiff has made out such a case. 190 Still, given the ease 
with which a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case under the approach 
advocated by the government, proof that a restraint produces benefits 
should undermine any presumption that the restraint produces anti-
competitive harms in the first place. 191 For, given such proof of benefits, 
proof that a restraint "forecloses" competitors from a "significant" or "im-
portant" channel of the market, for instance, is at least equally consistent 
with the defendant's claim that the restraint is entirely beneficial. 192 As a 
result, once a defendant has shown that a restraint or other practice pro-
duces significant benefits, there is no reason to adhere to a presumption that 
. [but] are nevertheless anticompetitive because of Microsoft's market power."). 
187 See Brief for Appellees United States and the State Plaintiffs at 47-51, United States v. Micro-
soft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213); Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclu-
sions of Law at 15-17, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233) (articulating this test); 
id. at 26-30 (arguing that Microsoft offered no legitimate purposes that explained its restrictions on PC 
manufacturers); id. at 32-38 (contending that Microsoft's proffered justifications did not explain certain 
exclusive dealing contracts). 
188 See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18, at 161-67. 
189 See id. at 161-70 (explaining how current Rule of Reason test is unduly biased against attempts 
to justifY non-standard contracts). 
190 See id. at 168; see also AREEDA, ELHAUGE & HOVENKAMP, supra note 172. 
191 See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18, at 167-70; cf Timothy J. Muris, The Government and 
Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All These Years, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 729, 734-40 (1999) 
[hereinafter Muris, Still Hostile After All These Years] (arguing that evidence that establishes a prima 
facie case under the Merger Guidelines should only give rise to a "weak presumption" that such transac-
tions are in fact anti-competitive, with the result that proof of efficiencies should rebut the presumption). 
192 See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18, at 161-70. 
278 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 12:2 
the challenged arrangement harms consumers and thus no rationale for de-
termining whether a restraint is too restrictive of"competition."193 
Similar shortcomings beset the approach to vertical mergers contained 
in the agencies' enforcement guidelines promulgated by the Department of 
Justice in 1984 and reiterated by both agencies in 1992.194 On the one hand, 
the currently applicable Guidelines do require careful delineation of rele-
vant markets and determination of concentration of the sort necessary to 
evaluate a transaction's effect on market power in an input market. 195 In 
addition, unlike prior case law and the 1968 Guidelines, the currently-
applicable Guidelines provide that the presence of efficiencies can in some 
instances preclude a government challenge of an otherwise anti-competitive 
transaction. 196 
Still, there may be less to these changes than meets the eye. For one 
thing, the FTC at least has challenged some mergers that do not warrant 
condemnation under the currently applicable Guidelines. 197 Moreover, 
agency briefs have questioned whether efficiencies are legally cognizable, 
suggesting that only the agencies can take such considerations in account 
193 See id. 
194 See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78. More recent Guidelines are limited to horizontal 
mergers. See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at § 1.0. However, the preamble to these 1992 
Guidelines provide that "[ s ]pecific guidance on non-horizontal mergers is provided in Section 4 of the 
Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines, read in the context of today's revisions to the treatment of 
horizontal mergers." 
195 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 284-85; Riordan and 
Salop, supra note 141, at 528-38 (explaining and elaborating upon this necessary condition for a raising 
rivals' cost strategy to succeed). 
196 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
197 In particular, during the 1990s, the Commission challenged mergers between pharmaceutical 
companies and pharmacy benefit management companies ("PBMs"). So-called PBMs develop protocols 
governing the prescription of pharmaceutical products by health insurance companies pursuant to the 
Iatters' contracts with insureds. In each case, the Commission obtained consent decrees regulating the 
manner in which the newly-created firms did business. See, e.g., In re Merck & Co., Inc., 127 F.T.C. 
156 (1999); Eli Lilly & Co., 120 F.T.C. 243 (1995). As one current Commissioner has noted, however, 
neither complaint explained how, exactly, the transactions in question could harm competition in any 
manner recognized by the Guidelines or any other generally recognized theory: 
Without indulging in a detailed commentary on the case, it is noteworthy that the sketchy 
complaint accompanying the order did not elaborate on the reasons for believing that poten-
tially favorable treatment of Lilly by a single PBM would give rise to competitive harm. As 
the dissent pointed out, the complaint did not appear to rely on post-Chicago theories of 
competitive harm, or explain how the decree would work to preserve competition. 
See Leary, supra note 75, at 130. See also In re Eli Lilly & Co., 120 F.T.C. at 256-58 (Azcuenaga, 
dissenting) (chiding Commission for relying upon outmoded foreclosure theory to support issuance of 
complaint and resulting consent decree); id. at 259 ("The alleged foreclosure resulting from this acquisi-
tion is not remotely related to the established standards for proving this competitive effect."); id. ("The 
conclusory allegations of the complaint do not set forth in a plausible claim under the standards in the 
1984 Merger Guidelines."). 
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when exercising their prosecutorial discretion. 198 Such an approach signals 
to the courts that efficiencies are not that important after all, and indeed 
irrelevant under the statutory scheme. 
At the same time, the Guidelines the agencies apply when exercising 
their discretion seem unduly hostile to assertions that a transaction pro-
duces efficiencies, particularly the sort of efficiencies associated with ex-
clusionary rights agreements. Indeed, the Guidelines currently applicable to 
vertical mergers contain no distinct discussion of methodology for analyz-
ing efficiencies generated by such transactions, choosing instead to incor-
porate by reference the standards contained in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines. 199 Those standards, in tum, would seem to recognize only those 
efficiencies that are technological in nature, excluding consideration of the 
sort of transactional efficiencies generally produced by exclusionary rights 
agreements.200 More precisely, the Guidelines' description of cognizable 
efficiencies apparently refers to effects that tend to reduce the cost of pro-
duction, narrowly defined, thereby offsetting any presumed increase in 
market power.201 Such a limitation follows naturally from the price-
theoretic partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm that has driven academic 
commentary about merger analysis in general and efficiencies in particu-
198 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion For Preliminary Injunction at 41, FTC v. 
Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 1998) (Nos. 98-595, 98-596) ("The Supreme Court has 
stated that 'possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality in Section 7 merger cases."') 
(quoting FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1966)); see also F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 
938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (lith Cir. 1991) (recounting Commission's argument that presence of efficiencies 
is irrelevant as a legal matter). 
199 See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at § 4.24. To be more precise, this section 
incorporates by reference § 3.5 of the Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines. That section, of course, 
has been superceded by subsequent agency action. See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at § 
4; see also id. at Preamble (explaining that 1984 provisions governing vertical mergers should be read 
in the context of the 1992 provisions). 
200 See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at§ 4. ("Mergers have the potential to generate 
significant efficiencies by permitting a better utilization of existing assets, enabling the combined firm 
to achieve lower costs in producing a given quantity and quality than either firm could have achieved 
without the proposed transaction."). The Guidelines also state: 
The Agency has found that certain types of efficiencies are more likely to be cognizable and 
substantial than others. For example, efficiencies resulting from shifting production among 
facilities formerly owned separately, which enable the merging firms to reduce the marginal 
cost of production, are more likely to be susceptible to verification, merger-specific, and 
substantial .... Other efficiencies, such as those relating to research and development, are 
potentially substantial but generally less susceptible to verification and may be the result of 
anticompetitive output reductions. Yet others, such as those relating to procurement, man-
agement, or capital cost are less likely to be merger-specific or substantial, or may not be 
cognizable for other reasons. 
ld. Cf WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 86-95 (explaining that vertical inte-
gration is generally explained by transaction cost considerations, and not technological ones). 
201 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 86-95 (explaining distinction 
between technological and other forms of efficiency). 
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lar?02 While useful where horizontal mergers are concerned, this paradigm 
is of more limited use as applied to vertical mergers, as it presumes that any 
efficiencies necessarily coexist with anticompetitive effects.203 Such trans-
actions generally produce non-technical efficiencies that may result in in-
creased distribution costs, a result that fits awkwardly into the partial equi-
librium paradigm. 204 
The 1984 Non-Horizontal Guidelines do provide that the Department 
will give more weight to assertions that a vertical merger produces efficien-
cies when there is an "extensive pattern of vertical integration," which 
"may constitute evidence that substantial economies are afforded by verti-
cal integration."205 Nonetheless, this assertion simply begs the question 
whether the efficiencies suggested by this pattern are cognizable. If not, 
then any pattern of integration would seem to be beside the point under the 
Guidelines. Moreover, in a dynamic economy characterized by heterogene-
ous actors and preferences, the absence of pervasive integration tells us 
very little about the efficiency of the practice. It may instead be the case 
that only some firms in the market find complete integration efficient, while 
others find less complete forms of integration appropriate.206 Finally, even 
if the agencies did choose to recognize non-technological efficiencies when 
evaluating vertical mergers, they would nonetheless apply ill-advised tests 
202 See Oliver Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoff.s, 58 AM. 
ECON. REv. 18, 20 (1968) [hereinafter Williamson, The Welfare Tradeoff.s]. See also Muris, Efficiency 
Defense, supra note 74, at 384-88 (applying this paradigm to illuminate trade-off between allocative 
losses and productive efficiencies resulting from merger that confers market power on new firm). It 
should be noted that the Federal Trade Commission relied upon Professor Muris' s article when an-
nouncing and applying an efficiency defense. See In ReAm. Med. lntn'l, 104 F.T.C. I, 501-09 (1984). 
203 See Williamson, The Welfare TradeojJs, supra note 202, at passim. 
204 See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18, at 147-61 (explaining how non-standard contracts may 
overcome market failure, and thus increase expenditures on promotion); Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 
supra note 125, at 6-1 0 (explaining how exclusive dealing arrangement can produce non-technical 
efficiencies); see also Muris, Still Hostile After All These Years, supra note 191, at 733-35 (contending 
that the Merger Guidelines give insufficient recognition to various forms of efficiencies); Muris, Effi-
ciency Defense, supra note 74, at 418-19 (contending that courts should recognize non-technological 
efficiencies). 
205 See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at§ 4.24. 
206 See Hayek, The Meaning of Competition, supra note 6, at 101-02 (contending that firms rarely 
share identical production characteristics with others in the same marketplace); F. A. Hayek, The Use of 
Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REv. 519,524 (1945) (contending that the main problem facing 
a market economy is the necessity of constantly responding to change); see also WILLIAMSON, 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 48 (explaining that propensity for opportunism may vary 
among different segments of the market, thus requiring discrimination between these segments); Wil-
liam J. Kolasky and Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies Into 
Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTIRUST L. J. 207, 208 n.3 (2003) (pointing out that "law-
yers tend to think of efficiencies only in terms of production cost savings, often neglecting allocative, 
transactional and dynamic efficiencies"). 
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when evaluating them. For one thing, the Guidelines seem to require that 
"cognizable" efficiencies tend to "offset" any alleged anti-competitive ef-
fects by decreasing prices or preventing price increases.207 This limitation 
ignores the very real possibility that vertical integration will enhance the 
quality of products sold by the resulting firm and thus increase the price 
that the product can command in the marketplace.208 Under the most natural 
reading of the Guidelines, both agencies might simply ignore efficiencies 
that manifest themselves in this manner.209 
Moreover, the Guidelines require that cognizable efficiencies be "spe-
cific" to the transaction in question, that is, not realizable through a means 
less restrictive of competition.210 Such a less restrictive alternative test ig-
nores the possibility that complete vertical integration can be a superior 
method of achieving transactional efficiencies when compared to hypo-
thetical alternatives proffered by lawyers?1 1 Given this widely-recognized 
fact, rigorous application of the "specificity" requirement may result in 
disapproval of mergers that create wealth.212 
207 See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at § 4 ("To make the requisite determination, 
the Agency considers whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger's 
potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that market."). 
While the prevention of price increases is only an example of how efficiencies can counteract harm, the 
Guidelines do not provide any other examples. See id. 
208 See generally Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18, at 134-139 (explaining how contractual 
integration that combats market failure may result in enhanced consumer demand and thus higher prices 
for the product in question); Kolasky & Dick, supra note 206, at 227-28 (same); see also Ill. Corporate 
Travel v. Am. Air Lines, 806 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1986) (sustaining agreement limiting price advertising 
by a carrier's agent because "[t]he question is not whether the arrangement affects moment-to-moment 
rivalry in a way that raises today's prices, but whether this effect is associated with potential benefits to 
consumers that are worth the price. Higher quality may come with higher prices."). For instance, a 
franchisor that integrates forward into functions previously performed by independent franchisees may 
thereby exert superior control over the quality produced by the franchise system and thus enhance 
consumer demand for the product in question. See generally Klein & Saft, Franchise Tying Contracts, 
supra note 122, at 349-54 (explaining how partial vertical integration can overcome market failure and 
enhance quality of franchise product, thereby enhancing demand for the product). Moreover, a manufac-
turer that integrates forward can ensure that its promotional efforts inure to the benefit of its products, 
and not to products sold by its competitors at multiproduct dealers. See generally Marvel, Exclusive 
Dealing, supra note 125. The result, of course, will be more promotion by the manufacturer and en-
hanced consumer demand for the product in question, thereby raising the item's price. 
209 See Muris, Still Hostile After All These Years, supra note 191, at 734-35 (criticizing agencies' 
failure to recognize promotional and managerial efficiencies). 
210 See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at§ 4. 
211 See supra note 206 and accompanying text (explaining that level of integration that makes 
sense for one finn might not make sense for others). 
212 See Brief for the Federal Trade Commission at 52-53, FTC v. H. J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-50362) (arguing that efficiencies adduced by merging parties were not cogni-
zable because one party had recognized that joint venture involving less integration "may be better") 
(emphasis added); FTC v. H. J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708,722-32 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (disregarding claimed 
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Similar problems apparently beset the agencies' approach to analyzing 
restraints challenged under the Rule of Reason. While neither agency has 
promulgated guidelines dealing with contractual exclusionary rights, they 
have issued joint guidelines governing their analysis of restraints furthering 
collaboration between competitors, guidelines that articulate the agencies' 
approach to Rule of Reason adjudication.213 Like the Merger Guidelines 
and positions taken in the Microsoft case, these "Competitor Collaboration 
Guidelines" reflect the influence of neoclassical price theory and thus the 
inhospitality tradition. Under the Guidelines, for instance, proof that a re-
straint results in prices higher than those that existed before the restraints 
ipso facto establishes a prima facie case.214 Such an approach makes no 
economic sense, as such price increases are equally consistent with a de-
fendant's assertion that such agreements overcome a market failure and 
thus enhance consumer welfare.215 Moreover, these same Guidelines pro-
vide that any efficiencies must offset the anti-competitive effects presumed 
once a prima facie case arises.216 Like the government's approach to mo-
efficiencies because of the possibility that the merging parties could achieve similar efficiencies without 
the merger); see also William J. Kolasky, Lessons from Baby Food: The Role of Efficiencies in Merger 
Review, 16 ANTITRUST 82, 85-86 (2001) (explaining application of merger specific requirement). 
213 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS, § 1.2 {2000), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 
13,161 [hereinafter COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES] ("Overview of analytical framework") 
(outlining basic Rule of Reason framework). To be sure, exclusionary rights agreements by their nature 
do not involve collaboration between competitors. In some cases, however, such agreements may lead 
to coordinated interaction between competitors. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. At any 
rate, any claim that an exclusionary rights contract produces competitive harm depends upon an asser-
tion that the agreement in question facilitates the exercise of market power to the detriment of consum-
ers. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text. For this reason, Professors Krattenmaker and Salop 
concluded that exclusionary rights agreements can produce horizontal effects. Krattenmaker & Salop, 
Raising Rivals· Costs, supra note 135, at 215 ("We analyze horizontal effects of vertical contracts."); 
see also id. at 224, 240-41 (explaining how exclusionary rights agreements can induce tacit or actual 
collusion). 
214 See COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 213, at § 3.3 (Agencies will re-
quire proof of procompetitive benefits where anti-competitive harm, i.e., higher prices, has resulted 
from an agreement) (citing FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986)); see also Mark Patter-
son, Market Power Requirement in Antitrust Rule of Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, 37 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. I (2000) (describing approach taken by decisions like Indiana Federation of Dentists). 
215 See supra notes 120-29 (explaining how exclusionary rights contracts can overcome market 
failure and therefore result in higher prices); Meese, Price Theory, supra note 18, at 147-51 (explaining 
how such proof is equally consistent with a defendant's assertion that a restraint overcomes a market 
failure). 
216 See COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 213, at§ 3.37: 
If the relevant agreement is reasonably necessary to achieve cognizable efficiencies, the 
Agencies assess the likelihood and magnitude of cognizable efficiencies and anti competitive 
harms to determine the agreement's overall actual or likely effect on competition in the rele-
vant market. To make the requisite determination, the Agencies consider whether cognizable 
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nopolization and mergers, then, these guidelines presume that, once a prima 
facie case arises, any benefits produced by a restraint necessarily coexist 
with anti-competitive effects. 217 
To be sure, many of these positions are consistent with current judicial 
precedents. Still, as shown earlier, agencies have departed from such prece-
dents in the past, and such an approach simply reflects the agencies' proper 
position as a co-equal branch of government. 218 Indeed, by embracing out-
moded doctrines, the agencies communicate their approval of such doc-
trines to the courts, thereby further entrenching doctrines that disserve soci-
ety and consumers. 
B. Implications and a Way Out 
As explained at the outset of this essay, the vast majority of exciusion-
ary rights agreements appear to be procompetitive.219 Taken together, the 
Raising Rivals' Costs and transaction cost paradigms would seem to con-
firm this intuition. While RRC suggests that some such agreements can be 
anti-competitive, the conditions necessary for such a result are several, and, 
even according to RRC's proponents, comparatively rare. 220 At the same 
time, TCE surmises that most such agreements produce useful benefits, 
even in some cases in which the conditions necessary for a raising rivals' 
costs strategy are present. Thus, even where such agreements create the risk 
of consumer harm, they may also produce offsetting benefits and thus "on 
balance" produce wealth. 
A well-considered enforcement policy would rigorously apply the 
RRC and TCE paradigms in an attempt to sort beneficial contracts from 
those that produce harm. Unfortunately, the policies embraced by the en-
forcement agencies are simply not up to this task.221 Instead, as explained 
efficiencies likely would be sufficient to offset the potential of the agreement to harm con-
sumers in the relevant market, for example, by preventing price increases. 
Jd. It should be noted that, unlike the Merger Guidelines, the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines take 
note at least of the possibility that restraints produce non-technological efficiencies. See id. at§ 3.36(b) 
ex. I 0. At the same time, however, these Guidelines would require proof that such benefits outweigh 
any anti-competitive harm and do not result in prices higher than those that existed before the restraint. 
See id. As explained in the text, such a requirement is unduly biased against these restraints, which may 
in some cases increase prices by overcoming a market failure. 
217 See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text. 
218 See supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text. 
219 See supra notes 5-l 0 and accompanying text. 
220 See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text. 
221 I do not mean to suggest that all enforcement officials embrace outmoded doctrines associated 
with the inhospitality tradition. Indeed, one suspects that the officials currently in charge of these agen-
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earlier, the agencies have repeatedly adopted enforcement positions that are 
unduly hostile to exclusionary rights agreements. While the resulting en-
forcement actions may incidentally interdict some agreements that produce 
net harm, the policies themselves may well deter a substantial number of 
beneficial exclusionary rights contracts.222 At the same time, by clinging to 
and invoking outmoded precedents and methodologies, the government 
lends its own considerable credibility to these approaches and likely slows 
the process of doctrinal evolution in the courts.223 
When it comes to exclusionary rights agreements, the current state of 
affairs is hardly satisfactory. Indeed, given the significantly over-inclusive 
nature of the government's regulatory approach, the case for continued 
agency supervision of exclusionary rights agreements is not proved.224 Af-
ter all, the mere existence of some market failures does not ipso facto jus-
tify the creation of a regulatory scheme to combat such failures. 225 Indeed, 
if anything, the current state of affairs may suggest that society would be 
better off if the agencies abandoned altogether any enforcement efforts 
against such agreements, leaving contracts to the market or private litiga-
tion. Cynics may even conclude that the government's failure to embrace 
what is now mainstream economic theory with any consistency shows that 
cies are less enamored with such doctrines than were officials in the Clinton Administration. See, e.g., 
Muris, FTC and the Law of Monopolization, supra note 153, at passim (arguing with great force that the 
Commission had recently embraced faulty monopolization standards). Still, as Madison reminded us, 
"[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 45 (James Madi-
son) (Gideon ed., 2001). By publicly reconsidering the agencies' enforcement positions and promulgat-
ing guidelines that thoroughly repudiate the inhospitality tradition, current agencies could make it more 
difficult for agencies to embrace such doctrines in the future. 
222 The Microsoft case provides a prime example of this phenomenon. On the one hand, the gov-
ernment's suit in that case may well have put an end to conduct that on balance harmed consumers and 
society. On the other hand, in pursuing the litigation against Microsoft, the government embraced vi-
sions of monopolization and tying law that, if pursued consistently, would destroy a significant number 
of beneficial exclusionary rights agreements. See supra notes 168-93 and accompanying text (describing 
government's reliance upon overinclusive doctrines). Moreover, having prevailed on the merits, the 
government sought remedies, including the disintegration of the firm and a ban on all monopoly bun-
dling, that exceeded any plausible theory of anti-competitive harm. See Meese, Don't Disintegrate 
Microsoft, supra note 159, at 776-801. 
223 Cf Turner, Address to the American Bar Association, supra note 69, at 686 (asserting that 
courts often defer to the enforcement agencies' views on antitrust questions). 
224 Cf Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J. L. & ECON. 1 ( 1964) ( articu-
lating presumption in favor of the free market, which proponents of regulation must rebut). 
225 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Regulated Industries: Discussion, 54 AM. EcoN. REV. 194, 
195 (1964) (explaining how shortcomings in regulatory apparatus can render results of regulation infe-
rior to those produced by imperfect private market). 
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agencies are simply incapable of pursuing coherently sound enforcement 
policies.226 
There is, however, an alternative that would justify continued agency 
supervision of such agreements. At least in the short run, the agencies could 
take it upon themselves to promulgate unified guidelines governing their 
approaches to all exclusionary rights agreements, whether they involve 
partial or complete integration. Such guidelines could articulate in a disci-
plined fashion just how these agreements can produce harm while at the 
same time outlining the framework the agencies will employ to analyze 
such arrangements. Like the current Merger Guidelines, this framework 
could begin by identifying those factors that a plaintiff-i.e., the govern-
ment-must establish to give rise to a prima facie case and thus cast a bur-
den of production on the proponents of the agreement or transaction. In so 
doing, the agencies could apply the RRC paradigm in a rigorous manner, 
requiring proof of each of the necessary conditions for such a strategy to be 
successful before presuming that an arrangement is unlawful.227 Such an 
approach would require the agencies to expressly abandon several positions 
they have taken in litigation and in current guidelines. For instance, mere 
proof that a seller has market power would not suffice to establish that a 
tying contract is unlawful per se.228 Nor should such proof establish a prima 
facie case under the Rule of Reason. Similarly, mere proof that a monopo-
list has entered contracts that "tend" to deprive competitors of some chan-
nels of distribution should not cast a burden of justification on the defen-
dant.229 Finally, proof that a restraint has resulted in prices higher than 
those obtained before the arrangement should not automatically give rise to 
a prima facie case, since such proof can be equally consistent with a defen-
dant's claim that such restraints produce significant benefits. Instead, agen-
cies should require proof that the structure of the relevant input and output 
markets is such that the contract or transaction under challenge can in fact 
raise the price that competitors must pay for inputs.230 
226 See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Debate: Public Choice: Do Politics Corrupt Antitrust Enforce-
ments? Economics Versus Politics In Antitrust, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 133 (1999) (arguing that 
political considerations lead enforcement agencies to pursue overly-aggressive enforcement policies). 
See also id. at 140 (suggesting that private litigation is less susceptible to political influence than public 
enforcement decisions). 
227 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (outlining the numerous necessary conditions 
for successful RRC strategies). 
228 See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text (describing government's adherence to per se 
rule); Muris, FTC and the Law of Monopolization, supra note 153, at 694 (outlining FTC's position 
during the Clinton Administration that government may establish a prima facie case against a monopo-
list without proving an anti-competitive effect). 
229 See supra notes 177-93 and accompanying text (examining government's position to this ef-
fect). 
230 See generally Krattenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 253-76 (detail-
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Of course, presumptions are rebuttable, and the presence of conditions 
necessary for a cost-raising strategy to succeed does not establish that it 
will, or that the harm from such a strategy will outweigh its benefits.231 Any 
agency guidelines dealing with exclusionary rights agreements must con-
tain relatively permissive standards governing the evaluation of claims that 
such agreements produce significant benefits. Perhaps most importantly, 
such guidelines should dispense with the agencies' current hostility toward 
non-technological efficiencies of the sort so often produced by non-
standard contracts. Such efficiencies enhance welfare every bit as much as 
the sort of technological benefits currently emphasized by the merger 
guidelines.232 It should not matter in this respect that such efficiencies may 
currently be less subject to verification and proof than technological effi-
ciencies like economies of scale.233 The relative ease with which econo-
mists discern and verify such efficiencies is by no means exogenous, but 
instead a (partial) function of the legal rules governing such agreements.234 
If the agencies in fact treat such benefits as cognizable efficiencies, private 
parties will devise methods for identifying and measuring such efficiencies. 
It is of course not enough for agencies to treat certain efficiencies as 
cognizable. They must also articulate some means of comparing or weigh-
ing such efficiencies against purported harms. The exact method of such 
comparison, it seems, should depend upon two different but related factors. 
ing the various necessary conditions for a successful raising rivals' costs strategy). 
231 See id. at 277-82. 
232 See Ronald Coase, The Institutional Strocture of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 713 (1992); 
See also Kolasky and Dick, supra note 206, at 249 ("Transaction efficiencies frequently facilitate firms' 
efforts to achieve allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiencies."). 
233 See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at§ 4: 
The Agency has found that certain types of efficiencies are more likely to be cognizable and 
substantial than others. For example, efficiencies resulting from shifting production among 
facilities formerly owned separately, which enable the merging firms to reduce the marginal 
cost of production, are more likely to be susceptible to verification, merger-specific, and 
substantial, and are less likely to result from anti-competitive reductions in output. Other ef-
ficiencies, such as those relating to research and development, are potentially substantial but 
are generally less susceptible to verification and may be the result of anti-competitive output 
reductions. Yet others, such as those relating to procurement, management, or capital cost 
are less likely to be merger-specific or substantial, or may not be cognizable for other rea-
sons. 
(emphasis added). 
234 See Kolasky & Dick, supra note 206, at 210 (contending that admission of efficiencies as a 
defense led agencies to refine their tools for evaluating such claims); see also Williamson, The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, supra note 202, at 34; Meese, State Oil v. Khan and the Continuing Incoherence of Antitrost 
Doctrine, 84 CORNELL L. REv. at 779-780, n.84 (suggesting that economic theory has evolved in re-
sponse to particular antitrust doctrines); HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 36, at 
436-37 (endorsing Rule of Reason analysis for vertical restraints in part because "policymakers and 
courts learn a great deal from studying the records of business litigation"). 
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First, what, exactly is the nature of the anti-competitive harm supposedly 
produced by the arrangement under scrutiny? Has the agreement allegedly 
increased the price that rivals are actually paying for inputs by, for instance, 
conferring a monopoly on a firm that supplies these firms?235 Or, instead, 
does the agreement simply threaten to facilitate tacit collusion among a 
variety of input suppliers?236 The former case would seem to indicate a 
comparatively high risk of anti-competitive effects and therefore would 
seem to require rather concrete proof of significant efficiencies in rebuttal. 
The latter would indicate a relatively low degree of competitive risk; not all 
concentrated markets in fact result in meaningful tacit collusion, for in-
stance. 237 In such a case, the agencies should require a relatively weak 
showing of the existence and magnitude of efficiencies to rebut a prima 
facie case. 238 
What, though, about what might be called the "mixed case," that is, 
where both anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects appear extremely 
likely? In such cases, the agencies must decide which effects predominate. 
In the end, the question is essentially normative, depending, as it does, 
upon one's assessments of the ultimate goals of the antitrust laws. If anti-
trust is designed to ban only those agreements that result in a net reduction 
of social wealth, then proof of significant efficiencies should overcome any 
presumption of harm. 239 If, on the other hand, antitrust bans all agreements 
that produce net harm for the consumers in the relevant market, without 
regard to larger social benefits, then the government should challenge this 
class of arrangements whenever they believe the restraints will confer mar-
ket power and result in higher prices.240 
235 Cf Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. DIC Concrete Corp., 467 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(analyzing agreement that allegedly left a rival at the mercy of a monopoly input supplier). 
236 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 135, at 240-42 (outlining so-
called Frankenstein Monster theory). 
237 Cf POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 85, at 60-69 (stating that the prospect of tacit collu-
sion depends on 14 factors in addition to market concentration). 
238 Cf Muris, Still Hostile After All These Years, supra note 191, at 738-40 (given weakness of 
evidence required to establish prima facie case against a merger under current guidelines, clear proof of 
efficiencies should rebut a prima facie case and establish the transaction's legality). 
239 See Williamson, The Welfare Tradeoffi, supra note 202, at 34; see also Robert H. Bork, Legis-
lative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. 7, 7 ( 1966). 
240 Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The 
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 65, 93-96 (1982) (contending that Congress 
meant the Sherman Act to outlaw all contracts that exercise market power, even if such contract in-
crease society's welfare); id. (asserting that the Sherman Act bai> only those restrains that reduce soci-
ety's overall wealth); see also David F. Shores, Antitrust Decisions and Legislative Intent, 66 Mo. L. 
REv. 725, 756-77 (2001) (comparing and contrasting total welfare and consumer welfare approaches). 
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CONCLUSION 
Recent developments in economic theory provide useful tools for dis-
tinguishing beneficial arrangements from those that produce harm. Such 
tools do no good, however, if regulators refuse to use them. While the en-
forcement agencies have backed away from many of the more extreme 
manifestations of the inhospitality tradition, they have also embraced and 
invoked certain doctrines generated during the inhospitality era. The agen-
cies should reconsider and abandon enforcement policies premised on such 
doctrines. 
